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ABSTRACT 
Three Essays on the Economics of Controlling Invasive Species 
 
 
by 
 
 
Yanxu Liu, Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Utah State University, 2014 
 
 
Major Professor: Dr. Arthur Caplan 
                            Dr. Charles Sims 
Department: Applied Economics 
 
 
This dissertation addresses issues pertinent to the control of an invasive species, 
issues that pertain both to a species’ introduction at a country’s international border and 
its spread within the country’s border. In the first essay, tariffs and inspections are 
examined as a joint border control mechanism.  In a deterministic setting, where the 
invasive species level is functionally related to a foreign (i.e., exporting) country’s 
shipment size, a traditional tariff can be optimal for the home (i.e., importing) country in 
the short run, but distorts the entry condition for foreign firms and results in a suboptimal 
industry size in the foreign country in the long run.  When the foreign country’s 
abatement effort determines the invasive species level, an additional home-country tariff 
on the invasive-species level (which I call an “invasive-species tariff”) is necessary to 
motivate the foreign firms to abate the invasive species at socially optimal level. 
In the second essay I consider the case where the invasive species contamination 
level is jointly determined by the foreign countries’ abating efforts and random 
iv 
 
environmental factors.  The home country may use standard contracts to mitigate 
imperfect observability caused by the random factors. However, I show that the home 
country must provide risk-averse foreign countries with higher subsidy rates than the 
first-best rates with perfect information as compensation for partially bearing the risk. 
When risk-averse foreign countries face both individualistic and common random 
environmental factors, a standard tournament scheme is capable of attaining the home 
country’s first-best invasive-species solution.  
The third essay addresses the control of an established invasive species outbreak in 
the home country with multiple spatially-connected individuals. The optimal response to 
invasion (eradicating, stopping, or ignoring invasion) is determined by the incremental 
damage of invasion and the marginal control cost. Different spatial scales lead to a 
divergence between the control incentives of society and individuals, and result in a 
deficiency of individualistic control, which in turn results in a larger steady-state invasion 
area.  Numerical analysis also demonstrates that the number, size, and spatial 
configuration of small and large individual land parcels influence the severity of the 
externality and the insufficiency of privately supplied control. I introduce a dynamic 
multiple-source-subsidy scheme to internalize the externalities, which prompts 
individuals to coordinate and follow the social optimal control path without a budget 
burden on the government.   
                  (188 pages) 
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT 
Three Essays on the Economics of Controlling Invasive Species 
 
 
by 
 
 
Yanxu Liu, Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Utah State University, 2014 
 
 
Invasive species have caused notable economic damages in agriculture, fisheries, 
forestry, and other industries over the past several decades. Invasive species control must 
therefore be designed to prevent the both the introduction and spread of invasive species. 
This dissertation examines the efficiency and efficacy of tariffs and inspections as a joint 
control mechanism at a home (i.e., importing) country’s border. I find that a traditional 
tariff can be optimal in the short run when the invasive species level is directly related to 
a foreign (i.e., exporting) country’s shipment size. However, in the long run a traditional 
tariff results in a suboptimal industry size in the foreign country.  When foreign countries 
can abate the invasive-species level prior to exportation, an additional tariff should be 
levied by the home country on the foreign country in order to induce the latter to choose 
the optimal abatement effort. 
Next I discuss the case of uncertainty, where the invasive species contamination 
level is jointly determined by the foreign countries’ abatement efforts and random 
environmental factors. The home country can no longer perfectly observe the foreign 
country’s abatement efforts due to this randomness. A standard subsidy contract can 
nevertheless induce the foreign country to optimally abate the invasive species level 
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(from the home country’s perspective). However, the home country must offer a higher 
subsidy rate than the corresponding rate under perfect information in order to compensate 
a risk-averse foreign country. I also find that a standard tournament scheme between two 
competing foreign countries can be effective in attaining the home-country’s first-best 
outcome when risk-averse foreign countries face both individualistic and common 
random environmental factors.  
For the control of an established invasive species outbreak within a home country 
that consists of multiple spatially-connected individuals, I find that individualistic (i.e., 
uncoordinated) control is suboptimal. The key reason for this outcome is the existence of 
uncompensated benefits associated with individualistic control. Individual participants 
with small spatial scales are only concerned with their own limited damages, which are 
subset of the social damages. I also find that the more individuals, and the smaller the 
average parcel size, the larger is the steady-state invasion area. The configuration of small 
and large individual land parcels also influences the severity of the externality and the 
result of individualistic control. I show that a dynamic, multi-source subsidy scheme can 
be optimal in these circumstances.  
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CHAPTER 1                                                                                                                   
INTRODUCTION 
 
Invasive species include nonnative plants,  animals, disease pathogens, and other 
organisms whose introduction cause, or are likely to cause, economic and environmental 
harm, e.g. to human, animal, plant, or environmental health (ISAC, 2006). Although 
some nonnative species are introduced for intentional beneficial purposes (Clout and 
Williams, 2009), many nonnative species are introduced unintentionally through 
contaminated commodities and packing materials, ballast water, and tourism. According 
to the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), roughly 12% of intentionally introduced 
species and 44% of unintentionally introduced species cause harm basing on the 
examination (OTA, 1993).  
Invasive species have been causing notable economic damages in agriculture, 
fisheries, forestry, and other industries over the past several decades. These damages, 
which are sometimes irreversible, materialize as commodity reduction, native species 
extinctions, biodiversity loss, human health threat, and diminishment of ecosystem 
services and aesthetics. Pimentel et al. (2005) estimate that invasive species cause 
roughly $120 billion of annual environmental damages and losses in the US.  Wilcove et 
al. (1998) estimate that invasive-species invasions affect about a half of native imperiled 
species in the US. Levine and D' antonio (2003) use species-accumulation model and 
forecast that invasive species will increase in the future as international trade expands. 
The urgency of prevention and control of invasive species has increasingly been 
recognized by regulatory authorities. Typical prevention measures include import bans, 
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permits, tariffs, inspections, quarantine, and education. Measures receiving the most 
attention in the literature have been tariffs and inspections (Costello and McAusland, 
2003; McAusland and Costello, 2004; Margolis et al. 2005; Mérel and Carter, 2008; 
Batabyal and Beladi, 2009). For the most part, this literature has ignored the abatement 
reactions of foreigns (henceforth foreign firms or countries). Exceptions include 
McAusland and Costello (2004), Amenden et al. (2007), Mérel and Carter (2008), and 
Jones and Corona (2008).
1
 Further, random factors affect the establishment of invasive 
species and subsequent damages, and also influence the behaviors of foreign firms. 
Particularly when foreign firms are risk-averse, uncertainty is an important factor 
affecting the foreign firm’s decision. The effect of uncertainty has also not been 
adequately addressed in the literature.
2
  
Controlling the spread of an established invasive species within the home country is 
another important issue needing to be addressed.  The spread of invasive species within a 
given region is ultimately a dynamic process. Therefore its control is an optimal control 
problem that includes multiple participants. A participant makes control decisions 
                                                 
1
   McAusland and Costello (2004) show that if inspection is not perfect, i.e., a positive unit cost of 
inspection with a less than 100% discovery rate, the optimal tariff rate comprises two parts - unit inspection 
cost and unit damage. If the infection rate is fixed, the combination of a tariff and inspection can realize 
optimal prevention. If the foreign firm can reduce the infection rate through abatement effort, the firm 
adjusts its abatement level according to its private interest with respect to the pre-determined tariff and 
inspection rates set by the home country. Since the foreign firm does not internalize the home country’s 
marginal damage from invasive species infection, its abatement effort is inefficiently low. Consequently, 
the home country prefers to set tariff and inspection rates above their respective socially efficient levels. 
The authors also offer a specific policy where the tariff and inspection rates are contingent upon the 
infection rate and thus induce the foreign firm to abate at the socially efficient level. Mérel and Carter 
(2008) follow McAusland and Costello’s (2004) structure and suggest a penalty on inspected contaminated 
goods in order to induce the foreign firm to correct its abatement effort. Amenden et al. (2007) discuss the 
foreign firm’s reaction to border enforcements.  
2
 Previous analysis of uncertainty has mostly focused on the introduction, establishment, and damage 
processes (Olson and Roy, 2002; Finnoff et al., 2005; Olson and Roy, 2005 etc.). Costello and McAusland 
(2003) also argue that the damage associated with an invasive-species invasion depends on the amount of 
agricultural activity. 
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according to his own interests, which in general is differs from what would be a social 
objective. Nevertheless, individual control creates benefit spillovers to other adjacent 
landholders and the public (i.e., positive spatial externalities), as well as negative 
spillovers, e.g., damage caused by the emigration of pests from high-density to low-
density areas. The fundamental reason for this dual externality is that the social planner 
and the individual participants differ in their concerns for and jurisdiction over the 
damage caused by an invasive species.  While previous work has acknowledged the 
existence of the positive externalities, far less attention has been devoted to this 
externality component.  For a socially optimal solution to the problem, it is thus 
necessary to coordinate the individuals’ respective interests with a social goal. An 
incentive scheme is required to overcome the deficiency of (or externality associated with) 
individual control.  
 This dissertation proposes various incentive schemes for controlling the spread of 
invasive species at or within the border of a home country. The first essay concerns 
control of the international spread of invasive species through an international trade 
mechanism. A modified tariff scheme is introduced to overcome the shortcomings of a 
traditional tariff scheme along the lines of McAusland and Costello (2004).  Control in 
the presence of risk-averse foreigns and environmental uncertainty is the focus of the 
second essay. An optimal subsidy scheme is analyzed in the context of a standard 
principal-agent model. A tournament scheme is also developed, where risk-averse 
foreigns face both individualistic and common random factors. The third and final essay 
develops a dynamic optimal control analysis of the within-region spread of invasive 
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species with multiple, private land owners. The deficiency of decentralized individual 
control is discussed and policy solutions are proposed. To illustrate the theoretical results, 
numerical analyses are conducted in each essay. 
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CHAPTER 2                                                                                                                                 
HOW A TARIFF WORKS AS AN INVASIVE-SPECIES CONTROL POLICY 
 
Abstract 
 
This study investigates the efficacy of a traditional tariff and proposes an invasive-
species tariff in a deterministic and perfectly-observability setting. The framework for 
this essay is provided by Spulber (1985) and McAusland and Costello (2004). When the 
invasive species level is functionally related to shipment size, the traditional tariff works 
well in the short term but distorts the entry condition of foreign commodity industry and 
results in a suboptimal industry size in the long term. A lump-sum subsidy or tax is 
necessary to correct the distortion. To the contrary, when the foreign firm’s abatement 
effort determines the invasive species level (i.e., the invasive species level is not 
functionally related to shipment size), the traditional tariff alone cannot provide the 
correct incentive for abatement. An invasive-species tariff levied directly on the invasive 
species level is necessary to attain the home country’s optimal invasive species level.  
Numerical analysis shows how the home country’s damages are affected by shipment 
size and the tariff levels. As the foreign firm’s abatement cost increases, total shipment 
size and the foreign industry shrinks, yet the shipment size per foreign, the invasive 
species level, the invasive-species tariff rate increase. As a result, the home country’s 
welfare decreases. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Invasive species outbreaks occur in three stages: the arrival, establishment, and 
spread phases. An invasive species becomes established when it has high population, 
wide distribution, and consequently very low possibility of extinction (Liebhold and 
Tobin, 2008). Therefore, prevention at the border is generally believed to be the most 
efficient way to prevent an invasive species outbreak from occurring. An unintentional 
introduction of an invasive species typically occurs through international trade, which 
therefore motivates exporting and importing countries to coordinate their prevention 
efforts.  
Typical prevention measures include import bans, permits, tariffs, inspections, 
quarantine, and education. Tariffs and inspections are the common preventative measures, 
which are also at the core of discussion and debate in the literature. Because unintentional 
introductions of invasive species are byproducts of trade, coordinated intervention is 
necessary. However, as the real problem is not trade per se, intervention measures should 
not necessarily restrain the flow of international trade. Rather, foreigns need to be 
provided with direct incentives to decrease the contamination level of their shipments to 
the home country.  A traditional tariff does not provide a direct incentive to abate the 
invasive species. This issue has not received enough attention in the literature, and is 
therefore addressed in this essay. 
In the general frameworks of McAusland and Costello (2004) and Mérel and Carter 
(2008), we find that in the short run a traditional tariff can be an efficient instrument 
when the invasive-species contamination rate exhibits a fixed relationship with shipment 
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size. This is essentially the same conclusion reached by McAusland and Costello (2004). 
However, we show that in the long run an additional lump-sum tax (subsidy) per firm is 
required to induce the optimal industry size in the foreign country. When this fixed 
relationship between contamination rate and shipment size is absent, a traditional tariff is 
shown to be inefficient.  An “invasive-species tariff” levied directly on the invasive 
species level itself becomes necessary to convey the correct abatement incentive for the 
foreign firm. In this essay, both the “fixed” and “unfixed” cases are assumed to occur in a 
deterministic setting.  
 
2. Literature Review 
 
The problem of controlling the spread of invasive species between and within given 
regions is, in many respects, similar to the control of nonpoint source pollution. To begin 
with, only the aggregate level of an invasive species attack is observable. It is difficult 
(too costly) to identify which source contributes to which portion of the damage. Further, 
the establishment and damage of invasive species depends on stochastic environmental 
variables. The specific contribution of a given source does not in general result in one-
for-one spread or damage. Nevertheless, invasive species have unique characteristics. 
First, with respect to the international spread of a species, it is possible to inspect 
imported goods, albeit imperfectly. Second, there is a time lag between the introduction 
of an invasive species and its associated damages. This entails having to discount 
expected future damages and control costs for optimal decision making (Kim et al, 2006; 
Olson and Roy, 2010).  Consequentially the economics of invasive species is 
concentrated on when and how to control the spread in the long run.  
10 
 
Invasive-species economics research generally proposes either ex-ante or ex-post 
control policies (Gren, 2008). Ex-ante policies are concerned with preventive 
management, e.g. control of the international or interregional spread of invasive species. 
Ex-post policies focus on controlling invasive species that have already entered and 
spread within a country or region. Policies therefore generally target three components of 
an invasion: introduction, establishment and spread, and damages (Gren, 2008).  
Allocating resources efficiently between prevention and control activities requires the 
consideration of prevention and control costs, potential damages, the growth rate of 
invasive species, and the discount rate.  
Mehta et al. (2007) discuss the role of detection activities in invasive-species 
management. They analyze the stochastic and dynamic factors governing the trade-off 
between allocating resources to the detection phase and the post-detection control phase. 
Using a constant detection strategy, they demonstrate that it is optimal to allocate more 
resources to detection efforts for species associated with high damages. However, for 
species with (1) a low efficacy of search, (2) low population densities, (3) low growth 
rate, or (4) where a cost-efficient control strategy is available, the optimal allocation of 
resources to search efforts will be lower than when the species causes high damages. Kim 
et al. (2006) argue that it is optimal to allocate more resources to what they call 
“exclusion activities” (prevention), before an invasive species is first discovered. They 
argue exclusion activities can be optimal if the invasive species population is initially 
beneath a threshold level. Above the threshold, exclusionary activities are no longer 
optimal. Finnoff et al. (2007) argue that a risk-averse social manager will prefer more 
11 
 
control than prevention due to the uncertainty of exclusion activities. However, 
preventing the introduction of an invasive species has a profound impact on the 
subsequent control of the invasive-species spread. 
Both intentional and unintentional introductions of invasive species can be thought 
of as market failures. Along these lines, Knowler and Barbier (2005) discuss the necessity 
of implementing policies, such as Pigovian tax, to control the size of breeding exotic 
species industry, which imports the breeding material of an exotic species and breeds 
through competitive nurseries for sale within a given region. The authors point out that 
without intervention the long-run equilibrium number of nurseries is higher than the 
socially optimal level. Excessive nurseries increase the risk of potential invasive species 
outbreaks. The authors also emphasize that a pollution evaluation on exotic species 
should be implemented before permitting their importation.  Their numerical illustration 
of Tamarisk spread shows that horticultural introducers should be taxed at a roughly less 
than 1% rate of average profits to ensure an optimal industry size (and thus spread of 
Tamarisk). They conclude that (1) the higher the hazard rate (the probability that a 
commercial plant becomes invasive at a specific time), (2) the more sensitive is industry 
size vis-a-vis the hazard rate, and (3) the greater the extent of damages from invasion, the 
higher the optimal tax on the introducers.  
Regarding unintentional introduction of invasive species, most studies assume that 
the invasive species level imported into a host country is exogenously determined 
(Costello and McAusland, 2003; McAusland and Costello, 2004; Margolis et al., 2005; 
12 
 
Olson and Roy, 2010).
3
 For example, Margolis et al. (2005) assume a fixed 
contamination rate and a constant damage rate of each importing good. Olson and Roy 
(2010) assume a constant size of invasive-species introduction. In each of these papers, 
the prevailing assumption is that invasive species distribute uniformly among imported 
goods. Under these assumptions, the importing country can therefore decrease the risk of 
invasive-species introduction through implementation of a tariff or inspection measures.   
A tariff decreases the volume of imports, and inspections provide a check on 
contaminated goods, each of which can reduce the incidence of invasive-species 
introductions. For example, Costello and McAusland (2003) utilize a two-sector balanced 
trade model of a small country that shows how increasing the tariff rate can decrease the 
rate of invasive-species introductions into the home country. As McAusland and Costello 
(2004) show, tariffs can work well in decreasing the risk of introducing an invasive 
species in a deterministic setting when the level of invasive species has a fixed 
relationship with the volume of the import good, i.e., there is a constant infection rate. 
The authors investigate a policy mix of tariff and inspection, where inspection can 
intercept a portion of the contaminated goods, which are then discarded at the foreign 
firm’s expense. The authors find that the optimal tariff and inspection rates are both 
positive under the assumptions of an exogenous proportion of infected goods to total 
received goods.  
Margolis et al. (2005) point out that trade politics can also affect the border control 
of invasive species. Using Grossman and Helpman’s (1994) political economy model, 
they assume that interest groups care solely about their respective member’s welfare, 
                                                 
3
 McAusland and Costello (2004) relax this assumption in Section 4 of their paper.  
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while the government cares about general welfare and contributions from the interest 
groups.  Interest groups represent the interests of private owners of each respective factor 
of production.  Rent to each factor depends on the price of the product for which the 
factor is used. The interest groups adjust their contribution schedules in an effort to 
secure high protection from imports. The authors show that an optimal tariff rate (from 
the perspectives of the government with respect to social welfare and political 
contributions) will always exceed the marginal damage associated with the species’ 
spread. 
In controlling the introduction of an invasive species, trade should not necessarily 
be restrained, as the real problem is not trade per se. For example, Peterson and Orden 
(2008) estimate that using alternative compliance measures to decrease pest risks, and 
removing seasonal and geographic restrictions on importing fresh avocados from 
approved orchards in Mexico, would increase U.S. net welfare by $77 million annually.  
Rather, the negative externality associated with the introduction of an invasive 
species caused by international trade needs to be more directly internalized. Since a first-
best externality policy generally applies the economic instrument (e.g., tax) directly on 
the invasive species level itself, tariffs levied on the import goods are therefore not 
generally a first-best instrument.
4
 Thus, tariffs imposed directly on the imported goods 
are generally not an efficient way to achieve an environmental objective, especially when 
the invasive species level can be changed through the abatement effort of the foreigns 
                                                 
4
 As Spulber (1985) points out, “under an output tax the firm will have an incorrect input mix and the firm 
may not engage in the right amount of effluent pretreatment activities…… (A transfer is thus) needed to 
correct the Pigouvian tax per unit of output.” 
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(McAusland and Costello, 2004).
5
  Toward this end, Mérel and Carter (2008) extend 
McAusland and Costello (2004)’s model by imposing a penalty scheme, which is 
imposed directly on the detected contaminated units with a tariff levied on total imported 
goods. They find that a penalty-with-inspection scheme generally outperforms a tariff-
with-inspection scheme. In the optimal solution, the tariff rate equals per-unit inspection 
cost.
6
 The penalty is set equal to the expected marginal damage modified by the 
effectiveness of inspection.  
Border enforcement is also addressed in the literature. Ameden et al. (2007) argue 
that increased inspection may result in decreased imports and increased or reduced “pre-
entry treatment.” The authors point out that pre-entry treatment technology and 
inspecting intensity can be crucial enforcement tools. Using a queuing theoretic model, 
Batabyal and Nijkamp (2005) find that a container policy (i.e. “inspects cargo upon the 
arrival of a specified number of containers”) is superior to a temporal policy (i.e. 
“inspects cargo at fixed points in time”). However, empirical estimates suggest that 
border inspection affects only a small percentage of imported goods, since the cost of 
inspection is high. For example, APHIS (Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, the 
                                                 
5
 As previously mentioned, McAusland and Costello (2004) show that the foreign firm reduces its 
abatement effort beneath the social optimal level if the foreign firm can mitigate its infection rate under the 
preset tariff-and-inspection scheme. The abatement effort of the foreign firm is not fully compensated when 
the tariff and inspection rates are preset. The home country can correct for the foreign firm’s incentive to 
lower its abatement effort before setting its trade policy, i.e., the home country can manipulate the tariff and 
inspection rates to induce more abatement from the foreign firm. The authors also offer a firm-specific 
infection-contingent policy which internalizes the invasive species damage to the home country. However, 
the policy-making cost may increase and compromise the benefit associated with the lowered infection rate. 
The tariff-and-inspection scheme is not necessarily efficient because it does not target the externality 
directly. 
6
 This result is the same as in McAusland and Costello (2004). 
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U.S. Department of Agriculture) examines only roughly 2% of U.S. international cargo 
(Haack, 2001).  
Sanitary and phytosanitary trade policies as prevention measures are discussed in 
several papers, such as Wilson and Antón (2006), Cook and Fraser (2008), and Olson and 
Roy (2010). Olson and Roy (2010) argue that if the marginal cost of sanitary and 
phytosanitary policy at fully protecting level is lower than the current and future marginal 
damage and marginal control cost, then fully protective trade policy will be efficient. 
Otherwise, partial or no protection is preferable.  Cook and Fraser (2008) show that a 
country may choose the same outcome through WTO compliance or a unilateral welfare-
maximizing policy. Sanitary and phytosanitary measures taken by the importing country 
should meet the SPS Agreement.
 7
 
As mentioned previously, the control of invasive species is similar in some respects 
to the control of nonpoint source pollution. Segerson (1988) initially proposed a linear 
ambient tax to control nonpoint source pollution. She shows that this scheme can give the 
correct incentive for polluters to abate at an ex ante socially optimal level for single or 
multiple polluters.
8
 Jones and Corona (2008) apply Segerson’s (1988) ambient tax 
mechanism to the ballast-water invasive species problem and argue without vessel-
specific information an ex-ante tax scheme can be used to induce vessels to choose the 
optimal abatement effort in the short-run. However, vessel-specific information is needed 
in a long-run optimal tax scheme, with a lump-sum subsidy provided to each vessel. Then 
they propose an adjusted ambient tax with random exclusions.  
                                                 
7
 The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (the "SPS Agreement") 
concerns the application of food safety and animal and plant health regulations (WTO, 1998). 
8
 Horan et al. (1998) investigate the use of a nonlinear ambient tax, as well as an ex post tax rate scheme. 
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Finally, Horan and Lupi (2005) propose a tradable risk permit system to motivate 
foreigns to control the contamination level of invasive species. However, the permit 
measure may be compromised to high transactions and administrative costs. Also, 
decentralized bargaining is unsuitable due to the complexity associated with multiple 
participants, as well as the inherent uncertainty associated with the spread of a species.  
 
3. Fixed Relationship between Contamination Level and Shipment Size 
 
 
3.1 Theoretical Analysis 
 
To simplify the tariff model, a partial equilibrium setup is considered. We assume a 
single commodity is traded internationally, which is contaminated by an invasive species. 
The home country, which does not have a domestic production of the commodity, is large 
and therefore exerts pricing power in the international market. Its objective is to 
maximize its own welfare (consumer surplus) net of invasive species damage. Also it is 
assumed there is no consumption of this commodity in the foreign country. We begin by 
assuming that a deterministic function describes the relationship between the level of 
invasive-species contamination (henceforth invasive-species size) and shipment size of 
the international commodity.  In the section 4, this ‘functional relationship’ assumption is 
relaxed.  
Following McAusland and Costello (2004), we assume the importing sector is 
perfectly competitive. There are n atomistic, identical, risk-neutral foreign firms that take 
the price determined by the home country as given. To concentrate on the effect of the 
tariff, the home country is assumed to inspect each shipment and to be able to detect the 
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corresponding invasive species size accurately. Since the optimal tariff induces the 
foreign firms to fully internalize the damages incurred by the home country, it follows 
that in cases where a non-zero invasive species level is optimal, and the home country 
does not necessarily discard the shipment.
9
  
Let   represent a representative foreign firm’s shipment size of the traded 
commodity, and   the corresponding invasive-species size imported by the home country 
from the firm. To begin, we assume     ( ), with   ( )     ⁄ .  (  ( )) represents 
the aggregate financial damage (incurred by the home country) caused by an invasive-
species invasion, where   (  )  (  )   ⁄  and    (  )  (  )   ⁄ .   is the per-unit 
price of the traded good.  represents the welfare level of the home country, and  (  ) 
is the benefit gained by the home country via consumption of the imported good, 
  (  )  (  )   ⁄  and    (  )  (  )   ⁄ . Since  (  ) can be thought of as a total 
surplus measure, it can be represented as∫  ( )  
  
 
, i.e., the area beneath the home 
country’s (inverse) market demand curve. Let    represent a uniform tariff rate on 
shipment size  ,   the constant marginal cost of inspecting each shipment,   each foreign 
firm’s profit level, and  ( ) each foreign firm’s shipment cost function, with 
  ( )     ⁄  and    ( )      ⁄ . 
Taking the number of firms,  , as given, the home country’s objective is therefore, 
                
  
 ∫  ( )  
  (  )
 
   ( ) (  ( ))     (  ) 
                                                 
9
 McAusland and Costello (2004) do not make as simplifying an assumption as this. In their case, the home 
country is unable to perfectly inspect each shipment, and thus their optimal tariff is supplemented with a 
penalty for any discarded portion of the shipment. The tariff and penalty together induce the foreign firm to 
fully internalize the control costs incurred by the home country.  Further, McAusland and Costello (2004) 
assume a linear damage function. The damage function used in this paper is more general than McAusland 
and Costello’s (2004).  
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                                 (  ( ( )))      ( )                                                                  (2.1)              
Totally differentiating (2.1) with respect to   results in, 
             
  
   
   
  (  (  ))
 (  )
  (  )
   
 (  )   (  ) 
                           
  (  )
   
 
  ( )
 (  )
  ( )
  
  (  )
   
  
  (  )
   
                                                (2.2) 
   Each foreign firm earns zero profit in long-run equilibrium. Therefore, 
               (  (  )) (  )   ( (  ))     (  )                                                  (2.3) 
where the commodity price   is taken as given by each firm. Totally differentiating 
equation (2.3), obtain,  
             
  (  )
   
 
 
 [  (  )  (  )⁄ ]
                                                                                         (2.4) 
Substituting (2.4) into (2.2) and reducing (2.2), we obtain, 
               
  ( )
 (  )
  ( )
  
                                                                                                 (2.5)                                                                                              
The optimal tariff rate is thus composed of two parts. The first part is the marginal 
invasive species damage incurred by the home country per shipment, where the damage 
and invasive-species functions,  ( ) and  ( ), respectively, are evaluated at the optimal 
shipment and industry ( ) sizes. The second is the marginal inspection cost per shipment. 
Although    fully internalizes the damage incurred by the home country per foreign firm, 
it does not provide firms in the foreign sector the correct entry incentive, i.e. given 
 (  )   ( )  (  (  )  (  ))⁄  ( )      ,    alone cannot simultaneously 
determine optimal n as well. 
As shown in Appendix A, an additional lump-sum tax (subsidy) per firm is required 
to induce the optimal industry size (Spulber, 1985). This tax (subsidy) is shown to equal 
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 [
  ( )
 (  )
 ( )
 
 
  ( )
 (  )
  ( )
  
] .Thus, only when the invasive-species size has a linear 
relationship with shipment size, is this lump-sum tax (subsidy) equal to zero, i.e., the 
traditional tariff levied on a firm’s shipment size determines both the optimal shipment 
and industry sizes. A nonlinear relationship between the invasive-species and shipment 
sizes therefore implies that if 
  ( )
  
  , when  
 ( )
 
 
  ( )
  
 at the optimal solution, a lump-
sum tax is necessary to decrease the number of foreign firms to an optimal level. When 
 ( )
 
 
  ( )
  
, a lump-sum subsidy is needed to optimally increase the number of foreign 
firms. 
 
3.2 Numerical Analysis 
 
In this section, numerical simulation is undertaken in order to illuminate how the 
traditional tariff policy derived in Section 3.1 works in the short run, and how it does not 
work as well in the long run when the invasive-species size is not linearly related to 
shipment size. As in Section 3.1, the home country is able to levy a tariff to jointly 
control the shipment and invasive-species sizes that accompany the imported good. In 
general, this type of traditional tariff results in a suboptimal number of foreign firms, a 
suboptimal total shipment size, and lower social welfare in the long run, thus 
necessitating the levying of a lump-sum subsidy in concert with the tariff. This numerical 
analysis is undertaken using GAMS 23.7.  
Assume the price of the traded commodity is determined according to the simple 
linear relationship, 
             (  )                                                                                                      (2.6) 
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Initially, the relationship between the representative firm’s shipment and invasive-species 
sizes is represented by the linear function, 
             ( )                                                                                                                  (2.7) 
Later, this relationship follows the increasing non-linear form, 
                                                                                                                                (2.7') 
The home country’s damage function is represented by, 
             [ ( ( ))]    [ ( ( ))]
                                                                                 (2.8) 
Therefore, the home country’s social welfare can be expressed as, 
              ∫ (
  
 
      )    (       )  
                              [ ( ( ))]
                                                                        (2.9) 
The representative foreign firm’s cost function is, 
             ( )        
                                                                                                (2.10)     
Therefore, its profit can be written as, 
                 (      
 )                                                                                  (2.11) 
The parameter values for this simulation exercise are set at                     
                   , and     . Results for the case of a linear relationship 
between shipment and invasive-species size are summarized in Table 2.1.
10
 
As indicated in Table 2.1, the optimal shipment is roughly 32 units per firm, and 
the optimal industry size is 24 firms, with a total shipment size of 745 units. The invasive 
species size is 1490 units, which causes more than two million dollars of damage in the 
home country. Based on the theoretical analysis presented in Section 3.1, the approximate 
                                                 
10
 Because the representative firm obtains zero profit in equilibrium, the home country’s social welfare is 
effectively total social welfare. 
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tariff level of $188,500 per firm results in the socially optimal solution for the case of a 
linear relationship between the invasive-species and shipment sizes. These results are 
benchmark values for the subsequent analysis. Through a simple comparative statics 
analysis, we can show how damage caused by invasive-species affects the shipment sizes, 
the price of the traded commodity, the tariff rate, and the invasive-species sizes (shown in 
Figures 2.1 to 2.4). 
 
 
Table 2.1 
Simulation results for the socially optimal outcome and associated tariff assuming a 
linear relationship between I and s (equation (2.7)). 
Variables 
 
Values 
Total shipment size per firm(s)                      31.62  
Number of foreign firms (n)                      23.55  
Total amount of traded commodity(ns)                    744.75  
Per-unit price of the commodity (P)                $ 6,276.25  
Invasive-species size (nI)                 1,489.50  
Total Damage level (D)         $ 2,218,620.44  
Tariff level per firm (τss)            $ 188,472.18  
Total home country welfare (W)         $ 3,605,258.22  
 
 
 
In Figures 2.1- 2.4, the invasive-species sizes, tariff rates, total shipment sizes, and 
the commodity prices are compared when the parameter of the home country’s damage 
function,   ,  changes from 1.0 to 2.0. The higher   , the more serious the damage 
caused by a given invasive species level in the home country. If invasive species damage 
is higher, the optimal invasive-species size is lower, and consequently the tariff rate 
increases, total shipment size decreases, and the commodity price increases.  
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Figure 2.1. The optimal invasive-species size with different invasive species damage 
level on the home country. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2. The tariff rate with different invasive species damage level on the home 
country. 
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Figure 2.3. The total shipment size with different invasive species damage level on the 
home country. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4. The commodity price with different invasive species damage level on the 
home country. 
 
 
 
As shown in Table 2.2, however, if the relationship between shipment and invasive-
species sizes is instead nonlinear (e.g., according to equation (2.7')), then the traditional 
tariff derived above results in a suboptimal number of foreign firms, shipment size, and 
invasive-species size. Under the traditional tariff, the number of foreign firms decreases 
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from the corresponding socially optimal level of 48 firms to only 18. In contrast, the 
representative foreign firm’s shipment size increases from approximately 13 to 32 units. 
Combining these results, the total imported commodity level equals 574 units, which is 
less than the socially optimal level of 623 units. Further, the total invasive-species and 
damage levels are lower than their respective corresponding socially optimal levels. But 
social welfare is lower in the traditional tariff scheme.  
 
 
Table 2.2 
Simulation results assuming a nonlinear relationship between I and s (equation (2.7’)). 
Variables 
Values 
Tariff Scheme Social Optimal 
Shipment size (s) 31.62 12.94 
Number of foreign firms (n) 18.15 48.11 
Total importing commodities (ns) 574.06 622.58 
Invasive-species size (nI) 1,364.55 1,415.22 
Damage level (D) $1,862,004.74 2,002,844.26 
Tariff level/per foreign firm (sτs) 215,460.26 83,281.57 
Total home country welfare (W) 2,872,079.21 2,971,866.69 
Price of the commodity (P) 7,129.68 6,887.09 
 
 
 
As shown in the Section 3.1, although    fully internalizes the damage incurred by 
the home country per foreign firm, it does not provide firms in the foreign sector the 
correct entry incentive, i.e.,    alone cannot simultaneously determine optimal n as well. 
This tax (subsidy) was shown to equal [
  ( )
 (  )
 ( )
 
 
  ( )
 (  )
  ( )
  
]   . If  
 ( )
 
 
  ( )
  
 , a lump-
sum tax is necessary to decrease the number of foreign firms to an optimal level; and if  
 ( )
 
 
  ( )
  
, a lump-sum subsidy is needed to optimally increase the number of foreign 
firms. For our particular simulation exercise, the lump-sum subsidy would need to be 
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$ 132,179 per firm, which in turn would induce the optimal number of foreign firms in 
the foreign industry.  
 
4. Non-Fixed Relationship between Contamination Level and Shipment Size 
 
In the previous section, where invasive-species size depends non-linearly on the 
shipment size, optimal social welfare cannot be realized solely through the 
implementation of a traditional tariff by the home country. In the long run, a lump-sum 
tax/subsidy is also needed to ensure optimal industry size. In fact (i.e., in a broader sense), 
invasive-species size is not fully determined by a foreign firm’s shipment size, i.e. 
invasive-species size depends upon the abatement effort of the foreign firm and other 
random variables. A tariff imposed directly on the volume of imported goods will 
generally not attain an optimal level of prevention (Spulber, 1985).
11
 Therefore, we turn 
to a case where a foreign firm can exert abatement effort to control the invasive-species 
level in its shipment, and, initially, the home country has perfect information as to the 
extent of this effort level. We also begin by assuming that there are no random factors 
affecting the invasive-species level. The third chapter of the dissertation will examine the 
consequences of relaxing these perfect information and certainty assumptions.  
 
4.1 Theoretical Analysis 
 
Here we assume a representative foreign firm can exert costly abatement effort, 
such as implementing a cleaner production process, using detective equipment, and 
adopting packing technologies that decrease the incidence of invasive-species 
                                                 
11
 McAusland and Costello (2004) design “firm-specific contamination-contingent policies” where the firm 
can choose to alter the contamination level of its shipment. This policy can induce the firm to implement 
optimal abatement effort in the short run. 
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contamination. Therefore, in addition to setting   , the home country must induce each 
foreign firm to choose optimal abatement effort (from the home country’s perspective) by 
setting a tariff rate on the invasive species level directly. Hereafter, I call this tariff an 
“invasive-species tariff”, denoted by   .    is imposed directly on the level of invasive-
species contamination,  I, which initially is assumed to be detected with certainty upon 
inspection. The home country’s objective function is therefore,  
             
   
     
  ∫  ( )  
  (     )
 
   (  ( )) (     )     (     ) 
                                 (  (  ))      (     )      (  )                                        (2.12) 
The first-order conditions for this problem are, 
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Again, each foreign firm earns the zero profit in the long-run equilibrium, therefore, 
               (  ( )) ( )   ( ( )  )     ( )     ( )                                          (2.15) 
where  (   ) is an foreign firm’s total cost associated with shipment size and the 
corresponding invasive-species size,    ( )     ⁄  and    ( )      ⁄  ,       
  ( )     ⁄  and    ( )      ⁄ . Totally differentiating zero-profit condition (2.15) we 
obtain,  
            
  ( )
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27 
 
Substituting (2.16) and (2.17) to equations (2.13) and (2.14) reduces the home 
country’s first-order conditions to, 
                                                                                                                                (2.18)     
               
  ( )
 (  )
                                                                                                           (2.19)     
As shown by (2.19), the invasive-species tariff rate is set equal to the marginal 
damage with respect to the total invasive-species size (evaluated at the optimal invasive 
species size). Equation (2.18) likewise reveals the traditional tariff (set directly on 
shipment size) is set equal to the inspection cost per unit shipment. The invasive-species 
tariff is therefore based directly on the marginal damages associated with the invasive-
species level. Through the invasive-species tariff, the foreign firm fully internalizes the 
damage cost associated with the invasive species level in the home country. As Spulber 
(1985) helps us understand, the invasive-species tariff corrects for the traditional tariff’s 
inability to control the externality directly as a sole policy instrument.  
Together, the traditional and invasive-species tariffs ensure an efficient invasive-
species incidence in the home country.
12
  Similar to Section 3.2 for the fixed-relationship 
case, a numerical simulation is now presented to demonstrate at what level the home 
country should levy an invasive-species tariff to induce the representative foreign firm to 
optimally control its invasive-species level per shipment in a deterministic setting.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12
 As shown in Appendix A, this policy scheme indeed achieves the same shipment and invasive-species 
sizes that result from the social planner’s problem. 
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4.2 Numerical Analysis 
 
Assume the price and damage functions are the same as in Section 3.2. The 
production and abatement cost function of the representative foreign firm is  
             ( )        
     
                                                                                   (2.20)     
 
 
 
Table 2.3 
Simulation results assuming a non-fixed relationship between I and s with different 
marginal abatement cost parameters. 
Variables 
Values 
Low Medium Medium high High 
c3=100,000 c3=200,000 c3=350,000 c3=500,000 
Shipment size (s) 66 77 89 97 
Number of foreign firms (n) 28 24 21 19 
Total importing commodities (ns) 1,868 1,845 1,822 1,806 
Invasive species level (I) 12 16 20 24 
Total invasive species level (nI) 343 385 420 442 
Damage level (D) 117,836 148,255 176,210 195,711 
Invasive species tariff rate (τI) 687 770 840 885 
Sum of traditional and invasive 
species tariff  levels per foreign firm 
8,417 12,565 17,319 21,227 
Total home country welfare (W) 8,843,573 8,659,651 8,478,369 8,345,794 
Price of the commodity (P) 659 774 888 972 
 
 
 
The parameters are again the same as in Section 3.2, namely                 
   ，                            . For this analysis, the parameter    is set 
at four different levels- low, medium, medium high, and high - in order to assess the 
sensitivity of the invasive-species control decision relative to increases in marginal 
abatement cost. Results for the corresponding social optima are summarized in Table 2.3. 
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As shown in this table, as the marginal abatement cost of invasive-species control 
increases, the optimal invasive-species level correspondingly increases, as do the 
invasive-species damage levels and the corresponding invasive-species tariff rates. Along 
with the increasing socially optimal invasive-species damage level, the home country’s 
social welfare decreases. The optimal invasive species control level is determined by the 
tradeoff between the home country’s invasive species damages and the foreign firms’ 
abatement costs. Once the abatement cost begins to increase, the home country concedes 
to accept more invasive species to counteract the now higher control cost.      
This numerical simulation exercise confirms the analytical findings in Section 4.1, 
in particular that when confronted with a non-fixed relationship between the shipment 
and invasive-species sizes, a tariff levied by the home country directly on the foreign 
country’s invasive-species size is needed in concert with a traditional tariff levied on the 
shipment size. As mentioned in Section 4.1, Spulber (1985) shows that a lump-sum 
subsidy is no longer required to maintain the optimal number of foreign firms in this type 
of scenario, where the home country is now able to levy a tariff directly on the invasive-
species level. The joint traditional and invasive-species tariffs provide adequate control 
for both the invasive-species size per foreign firm and the number of firms in the industry. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This essay investigates the efficacy of a traditional tariff when the invasive species 
contamination level is functionally vs. non-functionally related to shipment size, and the 
analysis of the invasive-species tariff that directly influence a foreign country’s 
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abatement effort. The modeling framework for this essay is provided by McAusland and 
Costello (2004) and Spulber (1985).  
As taught by McAusland and Costello (2004), a joint tariff and inspection scheme 
can be implemented to control invasive species at the border. This essay shows that when 
the invasive species level is functionally related to shipment size, a traditional tariff can 
optimally determine the shipment size and concomitant invasive species level. However, 
in the long run the industry’s entry condition is distorted, resulting in a suboptimal 
industry size. As Spulber (1985) informs us, a lump-sum subsidy or tax is necessary to 
correct the distortion.  Further, if the invasive species level is not functionally related to 
shipment size (i.e., is influenced by the abatement effort of foreign firms), a traditional 
tariff alone cannot provide adequate incentive on the abatement endeavor. Therefore, a 
policy instrument targeted directly on the invasive species level is needed.  We derive the 
optimal tariff in the context of the invasive species problem.  
In addition, we numerically analyze our conceptual results. We begin with the case 
of a functional relationship between shipment size and invasive species level, and analyze 
the effectiveness of a traditional tariff. We find that when the functional relationship is 
linear, the traditional tariff alone can attain the optimal shipment, invasive-species, and 
foreign industry sizes. When the relationship is non-linear, a lump-sum subsidy is needed 
to correct for industry size in the long term. We also find that increases in the home 
country’s marginal damage parameter leads to increases in both the tariff rate and 
commodity price, and decreases in shipment size and invasive species level.   
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For the case of a non-functional relationship between shipment and invasive-
species sizes, we assess the effectiveness of a separate “invasive species tariff” in 
achieving the home country’s optimal solution to the invasive species control problem at 
the border. Our main finding is that the invasive species tariff can motivate the foreign 
firms to abate the invasive species at socially optimal level. Numerical analysis 
demonstrates that when the foreign firm’s marginal abatement cost parameter increases, 
total shipment and foreign industry sizes shrink, but shipment size per firm, the invasive 
species level, and the optimal invasive-species tariff rate increase. As a result, the home 
country’s welfare decreases. 
The study of invasive species border control is complex. In reality, a given 
invasive-species size is determined not only by the foreign firm’s abatement effort, but 
also as a consequence of random environmental factors. In addition, the home country is 
precluded from perfectly observing the abatement effort undertaken by the foreign 
country.  Regarding this randomness and imperfect observability in the context of 
invasive species problem, we develop a principal-agent model in the next chapter to 
accommodate the inherent randomness and imperfect observability. We also develop a 
tournament framework in order to address the more general setting of both individualistic 
and common random environmental factors.  
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CHAPTER 3                                                                                                                                    
AN INVASIVE-SPECIES SUBSIDY AND TOURNAMENT UNDER 
UNCERTAINTY 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper addresses the issue of invasive species control when the importing 
(home) country has imperfect information about the abatement efforts of foreign 
countries (henceforth, the foreigns). The control of invasive species at the home country’s 
border depends not only upon a foreign’s abatement effort, but also on random 
environmental variables. Holmstrom’s (1979) framework is adopted for the initial design 
of a set of contracts between the home country and foreigns that account for 
individualistic random factors affecting the effectiveness of the foreigns’ respective 
abatement efforts. We show that a contract’s subsidy (provided by the home country to 
the foreign), is in general higher than the home country’s first-best subsidy under perfect 
information. Numerical analysis demonstrates the extent of the difference between the 
first- and second-best subsidies and the sensitivity of the optimal subsidy to the foreign’s 
reservation welfare level and marginal abatement cost. Following Nalebuff and Stiglitz 
(1983), we then develop a standard tournament scheme for the case where risk-averse 
foreigns face both individualistic and common random factors. We find that a rank-order 
tournament is capable of attaining the home country’s first-best solution. Numerical 
analysis suggests that tournament risk as a percentage of the loser’s subsidy (i.e., 
downside risk for the foreign) is sensitive to the foreign’s opportunity cost of 
participating in the tournament, but not its marginal cost of abating the invasive species. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Invasive species have caused extensive economic damages in agriculture, fisheries, 
forestry, and other industries over the past several decades (Pimentel et al., 2005). By one 
estimate, more than half of native imperiled species in the US have resulted from 
invasive-species invasions (Wilcove et al., 1998). Although nonnative species are 
sometimes introduced for intentional beneficial purposes (Clout and Williams, 2009), 
many species are introduced unintentionally through contaminated commodities and 
packing materials, ballast water, or tourism. Levine and D' antonio (2003) forecast that 
invasive species outbreaks will increase in the future as international trade expands. The 
need for trade policy to incorporate effective control instruments to halt the spread of 
invasive species is therefore urgent.  
As we argue in this paper, the prevention of invasive species depends not only upon 
the foreign’s abatement effort, but also on random environmental variables, such as local 
weather, location, etc. The concomitant unobservability of the foreign’s abatement effort 
complicates the ability of the home country to control for the introduction of an invasive 
species at its border. Typical prevention measures include import bans, permits, tariffs, 
inspections, quarantine, and education. However, these instruments do not convey a 
direct incentive on the foreign’s abatement effort. Neither do they account for the effects 
of imperfect observability of abatement effort in the design of optimal policy. 
This paper addresses the issue of imperfect observability of the foreign’s abatement 
efforts. Initially, Holmstrom’s (1979) framework is adopted for the design of a contract 
between the home country and a single or multiple foreigns that accounts for 
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individualistic random factors affecting the foreigns’ respective abatement efforts. Later, 
the assumption of independence of each foreign’s stochastic factors is relaxed through the 
introduction of a common random factor. A standard tournament scheme based on the 
framework developed by Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) is then examined in the context of 
two risk-averse foreigns facing individualistic and common random factors. 
We find that, in an effort to control the introduction of the invasive species in the 
home country, a bilateral contract scheme conveys optimal ex ante incentives from the 
home country to the foreigns through second-best subsidies when there are only 
individualistic random factors affecting abatement. Numerical analysis demonstrates the 
extent of the difference between the first- and second-best subsidies (where “first-best” 
means optimal subsidies under perfect observability), in particular the sensitivity of this 
difference to both a foreign’s reservation welfare level (or, opportunity cost of 
participating in the subsidy scheme) and marginal cost of abatement. We find that a rank-
order tournament is capable of attaining the home country’s first-best solution in the 
presence of individualistic and common random factors. Numerical analysis suggests that 
tournament risk as a percentage of the loser’s subsidy (i.e., downside risk for the foreign) 
is sensitive to the foreign’s opportunity cost of participating in the tournament, but not its 
marginal cost of abating the invasive species. 
The next section provides a brief review of the invasive-species control literature. 
Section 3 presents our basic modeling framework and the results for the foreign-specific 
contracts in the presence of solely individualistic random factors. In this section we 
consider the cases of a single and multiple foreigns.  Section 4 introduces a common 
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random factor and investigates the efficacy of a rank-order tournament in controlling the 
introduction of an invasive species in the home country.  Section 5 summarizes and 
concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
It is important to note that the level of invasive-species contamination is, in general, 
not functionally related to shipment size. The contamination level may also depend on the 
mitigation effort of foreign countries, as well as on other random variables such as 
geographic location, rainfall, and temperature. Stochastic factors also play important roles 
at each stage of an invasive species outbreak (from introduction to establishment to 
spread to damage). With respect to damages, a linear damage function cannot adequately 
represent the complicated relationship between contamination rates and damages 
incurred.
13
 Consequently, uncertainty is an important factor in making prevention and 
control decisions. To date, the uncertainty literature has only cursorily addressed the 
wide-ranging effects of invasive species’ introduction, establishment, spread, and damage 
in the home country. Similar to the literature on tariffs and inspections, research 
addressing these stochastic issues is still in its infancy.  
Olson and Roy (2005) find that prevention and control policies naturally depend 
upon the invasive-species introduction size, its growth rate, uncertainty associated with 
the species’ introduction, and the damage suffered by the home country. Finnoff et al. 
(2005) discuss the effect of feedback and risk aversion on private and regulatory manager 
                                                 
13
 For example, Jones and Corona (2008) assume a constant marginal damage rate in designing a Segerson 
(1988) type ambient tax mechanism for ballast water control problem. Similar to McAusland and Costello 
(2004), Mérel and Carter (2008) assume a linear damage function and constant marginal damage rate. 
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decision making in a setting of random invasion and stochastic growth processes. The 
authors show that the stochastic characteristics associated with an invasive-species 
introduction and its spread ultimately determine the (random) amount of damage. 
Similarly, Olson and Roy (2002) assign a random parameter to scale an invasive species 
spread, and discuss when eradication of an invasive species is optimal.  
Costello and McAusland (2003) consider different characteristics of uncertainty 
associated with an invasive-species’ introduction, establishment and associated damage. 
The authors show that, when accounting for uncertainty, the enforcement of a tariff can 
decrease the risk of introducing an invasive species, but possibly increase the potential 
range of damages due to increased crop production in the home country. They classify 
damages according to three different categories: augmented damages, neutral damages, 
and diminished damages. The categories are distinguished by the responsiveness of 
damages to the level of agricultural activity. In particular, as agricultural activity 
increases, crop damage is likely to increase due to a larger area now susceptible to the 
spread of invasive species. Also, as more lands are tilled, ecosystems are more disturbed, 
thus precipitating ecological damage. This is what the authors call augmented damages. 
Damage from marine and aquatic systems is considered as neutral with respect to 
agricultural activities.
14
  
Costello and McAusland (2003) find that an increase in the (traditional) tariff rate 
reduces expected neutral and diminished-typed damages unambiguously for a small 
agricultural-good importing economy. However, if the responsiveness of damages to the 
level of agricultural activity is high enough, raising the tariff rate in turn increases 
                                                 
14
 The authors do not provide an example of diminished damage. 
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expected augmented-typed damages. For a small agricultural good exporting economy, 
an increase in the tariff rate reduces expected augmented and neutral damages. Therefore, 
the responsiveness of damages to the level of agricultural activity should be considered in 
tariff policy making.  
Burnett (2006) finds that regions do not invest enough in prevention of invasive 
species outbreaks when facing a “weaker link public good technology.” The transparency 
of information concerning other regions’ respective prevention costs affects the efficient 
prevention level in the home region. Feng et al. (2008) suggest a tradable risk permit 
system using the log of firm success probabilities as the risk instrument for weakest link 
technology.  Prevention measures receiving the most attention in the broader invasive-
species literature have been tariffs and inspections (Costello and McAusland, 2003; 
McAusland and Costello, 2004; Margolis et al. 2005; Mérel and Carter, 2008; Batabyal 
and Beladi, 2009). However, in general, a traditional tariff scheme does not provide a 
sufficient incentive for foreigns to undertake optimal abatement effort, as shown in 
Chapter 2.  
Horan et al. (2002) find that the marginal control cost should equal the marginal 
expected benefit at an optimal abatement level, which is also optimal for the home 
country. However, the home country cannot perfectly observe the foreign’s abatement 
effort, similar to the classic case where a principal employs an agent and provides a 
reward based upon the agent’s performance. Holmstrom (1979) develops the seminal 
theoretical structure whereby the principal determines a payoff scheme based upon 
stochastic profit in order to motivate the agent to act according to the principal’s best 
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interest. In international trade, the home country must incorporate these factors in the 
formulation of its compensation scheme, or contract, in order to prevent the spread of 
invasive species when trading with foreigns, especially with risk-averse foreigns.  
The existence of a common random factor generally precludes individualistic 
contracts from obtaining an ex ante optimum from the home country’s perspective. Green 
and Stokey (1983) and Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) show that if (1) there is a common 
random shock to the output of each agent, (2) the common shock’s distribution is diffuse 
enough, or  (3) the number of agents is large, individualistic contracts are generally 
dominated (in terms of the principal’s welfare) by a tournament scheme. Holmstrom 
(1982) shows how a contest can reveal information about the respective agents. 
McLaughlin (1988) compares tournaments in a variety of model frameworks, such as 
Lazear and Sherwin (1981), Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983), Green and Stokey (1983) and 
O'Keeffe et al. (1984), and validates the efficiency of a tournament in the presence of a 
more risky common stochastic factor. 
In the case of a common random factor, a subsidy scheme based upon a foreign’s 
relative rather than absolute performance is required. In the case of invasive-species 
border control, this means that each foreign’s invasive-species size is a stochastic 
function of its own abatement effort, a country-specific random factor, and random 
shocks common to all foreigns (e.g. climate change, extreme weather events.). As 
Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) and Green and Stokey (1983) show, a tournament generally 
outperforms adjusted contracts in the presence of a common random factor. As 
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mentioned in Section 1, this paper explores the implementation of a contract and a 
tournament in the context of the invasive-species control problem. 
 
3. Individualistic Invasive Species Contracts 
 
 
3.1 The Basic Model and its Benchmark Solution 
 
We begin by assuming that the effect of the foreign’s abatement effort on a 
potential invasive species level in the home country is partially determined by a random 
state of nature, denoted by random variable , which nevertheless has a commonly 
known probability distribution. For simplicity, we refer to  as the composite level of 
random factors instead of a vector of separate stochastic factors. Thus, the invasive-
species level can be defined as    (   ) with       ( )     ⁄  and      
   ( )      ⁄  , where   represents the abatement effort undertaken by the foreign.  
Following Mirrlees’ (1976) and Holmstrom’s (1979) parameterized distribution 
formulation,   is suppressed and I is viewed directly as a random variable, with a 
conditional cumulative distribution function defined over the invasive-species 
contamination level,  (   ), and corresponding conditional density function  (   ). 
Density function   (   ) is everywhere non-negative and continuously differentiable in  . 
Because      and   (   )   ,  it is further assumed that  (   
 ) under low abatement 
effort,   , first-order stochastic dominates  (    ) under high abatement effort,  
 .
 
This 
in turn implies that the home country’s expected invasive-species level from imported 
goods when the foreign chooses    is never less than that which results from   . 
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The foreign is assumed strictly risk-averse. Its total welfare depends upon three 
components: net revenue from the sale of its commodity, the subsidy offered by the home 
country (through a contract), and its abatement cost. Let c(s) represent the foreign’s total 
cost associated with shipment size, with   ( )     ⁄  and    ( )      ⁄ . The 
function  (    ( )) represents net welfare obtained from its exported commodity, 
          , and  ( ( ))  represents welfare obtained from the home country’s 
subsidy,           . 15 16  Let  ( ) represent the foreign’s abatement cost, or 
disutility from abatement. This disutility may reflect both monetary and non-monetary 
expenses, e.g., expenses associated with harmful effects and the corresponding 
inconvenience caused by the control efforts.
17
  The disutility function satisfies     
            .18 
Let   ( ) represent the lump-sum invasive-species subsidy under perfect 
information, or observability. Assume the home country offers the foreign a contract 
specifying    , and   ( ), which the foreign can either accept or reject. If the foreign 
rejects the contract,      and   ( )        To induce the foreign to accept the contract, 
the home country must provide the foreign with at least its reservation expected welfare 
level  ̅. This constraint on the home country’s choice of the subsidy is commonly known 
                                                 
15
 The concave transformation of net revenue and subsidy of the foreign is to describe the risk-aversion of 
foreign country (Malik, 1990; Silberberg and Suen, 2001). 
16
   ( ) refers to the first derivative of  ( ) with respect to commodity revenue.  
 ( )    represents the 
first derivative of  ( ) with respect to the subsidy offered by the home country. The corresponding second 
derivatives of the two functions,                , ensure that the foreign is risk averse.   
17
 For example, pesticides, which are used in controlling insects, may cause polluting effects harmful to 
human health. Oceanic ballast water exchange is commonly considered to be an unsafe action for vessels 
(Horan and Lupi, 2005). 
18
 We therefore effectively assume separability in shipment and abatement costs, which greatly simplifies 
the ensuing analysis. 
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as a “participation constraint.”  The optimal invasive-species subsidy scheme for the 
home country then solves,  
               
    ( )
  ∫  ( )  
 
 
  ( )     
                                ∫ ( ) (   )   ∫   ( ) (   )                                               (3.1)  
                     s.t.   ( ( )   ( ))  ∫ (  ( )) (   )    ( )   ̅.                                         
where   is the constant marginal inspection cost at the home country’s border. To 
simplify notation, we henceforth suppress the lower and upper limits of integration 
associated with the level of I. This problem can be analyzed in two stages. In the stage 
one, the home country determines the optimal invasive-species subsidy to include in its 
contract for any given level of g. In stage two, the home country likewise determines the 
optimal contract’s level of  .  
Since it gains nothing by providing the foreign expected welfare in excess of  ̅, the 
home country adjusts    ( ) to a level at which the foreign just accepts its contract offer. 
Therefore, the constraint in (3.1) binds at any solution to the home country’s problem. Let 
   represent the multiplier associated with this constraint,    . The Lagrangian function 
is then, 
              (    ( ))  ∫  ( )  
 
 
  ( )     ∫ ( ) (   )   ∫   ( ) (   )   
                              { ( ( )   ( ))  ∫ (  ( )) (   )    ( )   ̅}        (3.2) 
and the associated first-order conditions are: 
            
  ( )
  
  
  ( )
  
     [  ( )
  ( )
  
 ]                                                           (3.3) 
            
  ( )
   ( )
   (   )     (  ( )) (   )                                                           (3.4) 
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which implies,  
            
 
  (  ( ))
                                                                                                      (3.5) 
Since the foreign is strictly risk averse (recall that       and  
    ), the optimal 
lump-sum subsidy    ( ) is constant, or fixed, with respect to s and I. However,   ( ) is 
not constant with respect to  , as we show below. In the context of international invasive-
species control, the fixed subsidy is a classic result indicating that the home country’s 
optimal strategy is to fully insure the risk-averse foreign against the uncertain level of 
invasive-species associated with its shipments (Holmstrom, 1979).  
Under perfect observability, the optimal subsidy therefore depends directly on the 
foreign’s observable abatement effort,  , and solves  
             ( ( )   ( ))   (  ( ))   ( )   ̅                                                         (3.6) 
We label this subsidy level   ( )     { ̅   ( )   ( ( )   ( ))}. Optimal 
abatement effort,   , in turn maximizes the home country’s welfare,  ∫  ( )  
 
 
 
 ( )     ∫ ( ) (   )      { ̅   ( )   ( ( )   ( ))}, which via the 
inverse function rule,  results in the first-order condition, 
             ∫ ( )  (   )   
 
  ( )
  ( )                                                                     (3.7) 
where all choice variables are evaluated at their optimal levels. The optimal subsidy is 
therefore represented as 
              (  )     { ̅   (  )   ( (  )    (  ))}                                             (3.8) 
To induce the foreign to choose optimal abatement level   , the home country can 
set the invasive-species subsidy scheme according to, 
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              ( )  {
      { ̅   (  )   ( (  )   (  ))}           
                                                                                   
                  (3.8') 
where    is a specific subsidy level that maximizes the home country’s welfare and also 
satisfies the foreign’s  “participation constraint” at optimal abatement level   .     is 
determined by   , with      . In this case,    is set equal to zero. Being able to 
perfectly observe the foreign’s abatement effort, the home county should therefore set an 
invasive-species subsidy scheme at one of two different levels to induce the foreign to 
select optimal effort level,   . If   is not less than   , the home country offers the foreign 
subsidy   , otherwise it offers subsidy   . Ultimately the foreign voluntarily chooses   , 
which provides it with reservation expected welfare level  ̅ .   
 
3.2 Unobservable Abatement Effort and a Single Foreign 
 
As shown in the previous section, when abatement effort is perfectly observable the 
home country specifies in its contract an optimal effort choice by fully insuring the 
foreign against risk. However, when abatement effort is unobservable, optimal effort can 
only be induced at the cost of the foreign bearing some risk. This is a standard result in 
the principal-agent literature (Holmstrom, 1979). 
Because the foreign’s abatement effort is unobservable, the home country needs to 
ensure that the effort level specified in the contract is optimal from the foreign’s 
perspective given the offered subsidy. To do this, the home country must satisfy an 
additional “incentive-compatibility constraint” in specifying its contract offer.  Letting 
  (I) denote the invasive-species subsidy in this case, the optimal contract for 
implementing   solves,  
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    ( )
  ∫  ( )  
 
 
  ( )     ∫ ( ) (   )   
                                 ∫   ( ) (   )                                                                             (3.9) 
            s.t.  ( ) ( ( )   ( ))  ∫ (  ( )) (   )    ( )   ̅.                                         
                    (  )                       
                             
   
 ( ( )   ( ))  ∫ (  ( )) (   )    ( ) 
Constraint (i) is the familiar participation constraint introduced previously in 
Section 3.1, while constraint (ii) is the incentive-compatibility constraint. Again, 
constraint (i) binds at the solution to this problem. Constraint (ii) insures that the 
contracted   and s levels are optimal from the foreign’s perspective.19  Using 
Holmstrom’s (1979) first-order approach, constraint (ii) is represented by the following 
two equations, 
              
  ( )
  
                                                                                                       (3.10) 
            ∫ ( )  (   )    
 ( )                                                                              (3.11)     
Letting     be the multiplier for constraint (i), and     and     the 
multipliers for constraints (3.10) and (3.11), respectively, the Lagrangian function for this 
problem is specified as 
              ( )  ∫  ( )  
 
 
  ( )     ∫ ( ) (   )    ∫   ( ) (   )   
  { ( ( )   ( ))  ∫ (  ( )) (   )    ( )   ̅} 
                           { ( )  
  ( )
  
} 
                                                 
19
 Shipment price P is taken as given in the constraint for this problem. 
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                          {∫ ( )  (   )    
 ( )}                                                              (3.12) 
       First-order conditions for an interior solution are:
 20
 
            
  ( )
  
  
  ( )
  
       ( )
  ( )
  
   {
  ( )
  
 
   ( )
   
}                             (3.13) 
            
  ( )
   ( )
   (   )     ( ) (   )     ( )  (   )                                     (3.14)     
which implies 
            
 
  ( )
    
  (   )
 (   )
                                                                                            (3.15) 
and 
             
  ( )
  
  ∫ ( )  (   )   ∫  
 ( )  (   )   
                           [∫ (  ( ))   (   )    
  ( )]=0                                              (3.16)     
            
  ( )
  
  ( ( )   ( ))  ∫ (  ( )) (   )    ( )   ̅                     (3.17) 
            
  ( )
  
  ( )  
  ( )
  
                                                                                       (3.18) 
            
  ( )
  
 ∫ ( )  (   )    
 ( )                                                                   (3.19) 
where condition (3.16) uses equation (3.11).We begin by noting that     and    . 
This result then enables us to derive the condition under (and the degree to) which the 
subsidy in this problem is “inefficient” from the perspective of its deviating from the 
home country’s optimal subsidy under perfect observability. The subsidy,   ( ), is 
                                                 
20
 Equation (3.13) is a condition the home country must satisfy in order to ensure the optimal shipment size. 
At the same time, the home country takes the first-order condition (equation (3.10)) as one of its constraints 
in its welfare-maximizing decision. This condition ensures the home country’s optimal shipment size is 
also the optimal shipment size from the point of view of the foreign.  It aligns decisions of the home 
country and foreign through the change in the price of the tradable commodity.   
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therefore  a second-best solution due to the home country’s need to satisfy the incentive 
constraint.  
Lemma 3.1. Assume   ( )    and   ( )     ⁄ , then     and    . 
Therefore both constraints are binding. (Proof is provided in the Appendix B.) 
Corollary 3.1.  Lump-sum subsidy   ( ) has the following relationship with   ( ): 
            {
  ( )    ( )                         
  ( )    ( )                          
  ( )    ( )                          
                                                                     (3.20) 
where    {     (   )    },  
   {    (   )    }, such that  
     {    (   )   
 } respectively. 
Given     and    , Corollary 3.1 follows directly from condition (3.15). It 
says that subsidy   ( ) is higher than the first-best subsidy   ( ) when I is lower than the 
mean level obtained under   ( ), i.e., the probability of the foreign exerting high 
abatement effort exceeds that of exerting low level abatement effort.  
Using Lemma 3.1 again, we can state a second corollary, 
Corollary 3.2. The second-best solution (i.e., the solution with   ( ) ) is strictly 
inferior to the first-best solution (i.e., the solution with   ( ) ) . 
The proof of this corollary follows Holmstrom (1979), which states that because 
    and   (   )  (   ) is non-constant in I, the second-best solution is therefore 
strictly inferior to the first-best solution. 
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Table 3.1 
Simulation functions assuming a single foreign. 
No. 
Function 
Name 
Description Function 
1  ( ) Price of the tradable commodity   ( )         
2  ( ) 
Home country’s total damage from the 
invasive species 
 ( )     
  
3  ( ) Foreign's welfare function from its shipment 
profit 
21
 
 ( )    ( ( )   ( ))  
4  ( ) Foreign's  welfare function from the subsidy   (  ( ))   √  ( ) 
5  ( ) Foreign's production cost function   ( )        
  
6  ( ) Foreign's abatement cost function   ( )     
  
7  (   ) Conditional probability density function for I   (   )    
    
 
 
 
Finally, equation (3.15) suggests that the optimal invasive-species subsidy schedule 
is not likely to have a simple linear relationship with the invasive species level, i.e., the 
schedule   ( ) is a potentially complicated function of I. To demonstrate this feature of 
the subsidy scheme, we now provide a simple numerical analysis of the problem. The 
corresponding functions used in this analysis are summarized in the Table 3.1. 
The probability density function for this exercise,  (   )  is defined as an 
exponential function over abatement effort level g.  For the remaining functions, 
quadratic and linear functional forms are adopted in order to make the simulation exercise 
tractable. Initially, the parameters are set as  ̅                       
                                               .  Corresponding 
results are then calculated for the cases of three different foreign reservation utility levels 
(assuming marginal abatement cost is fixed at     ), and three different marginal 
                                                 
21
 The assumption of a linear function defined over the foreign’s profit facilitates computation without 
sacrificing the more general implications of the central results. Risk-aversion is captured by the non-linear 
function defined over the subsidy, i.e., the expression for  ( ). 
51 
 
abatement cost parameters (assuming reservation utility is fixed at 100). Results are 
presented in Table 3.2. 
As shown in Table 3.2, the foreign exports a 40-unit shipment to the home country, 
which is unaffected by changes in the foreign’s reservation welfare and marginal 
abatement cost. The reason for this is that the optimal shipment size is determined by the 
equality of marginal production cost with the price of the traded commodity (condition 
(3.10)). However, these changes nevertheless influence the foreign’s abatement effort. 
 
 
Table 3.2 
Simulation results for the single foreign. 
Variables 
Welfare Constraint        
(when z1=5) 
Abatement Cost            
(when  ̅=100) 
Low 
 ̅=80 
Medium     
 ̅=100 
High  
 ̅=110 
Low     
z1=5 
Medium   
z1=10 
High      
z1=15 
Tradable commodity 
shipment size (s) 
40 40 40 40 40 40 
Tradable commodity 
equilibrium price ( ) 
1,600 1,600 1,600 1,600 1,600 1,600 
Abatement effort level ( ) 1.680 1.621 1.595 1.621 1.310 1.155 
Multiplier   22.053 31.573 36.36 31.573 33.581 35 
Multiplier   7.078 6.697 6.506 6.697 6.617 6.56 
Multiplier   23.691 21.316 20.289 21.316 22.483 23.094 
Expected subsidy 
( (  ( ))) 
685 1,170 1,484 1,170 1,422 1,625 
First-best subsidy (  ) 486 997 1,322 997 1,128 1,225 
Expected welfare (E(W)) 6,526 5,989 5,650 5,989 5,332 4,796 
First-best welfare (W) 6,725 6,162 5,812 6,162 5,627 5,196 
 
 
 
As both   ̅  and z1 increase, the foreign’s abatement effort decreases. In contrast, its 
expected subsidy increases in both  ̅  and z1. Because  ̅ is the foreign’s participation 
constraint, the home country must provide the foreign with at least   ̅ (in fact, just  ̅) to 
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accept the contract. In the case of larger reservation welfare, the home country must 
provide a higher subsidy for the foreign to sign the contract with a fixed optimal shipment 
size. As discussed above, the optimal control level is determined by the tradeoff between 
the home country’s invasive species damage level and the foreign’s abatement costs. 
Once the foreign’s marginal abatement cost increases, the home country must concede to 
accept a larger invasive species spread, all else equal. The participation and incentive-
compatibility constraints now require the home country to provide the foreign with a 
higher subsidy to achieve an optimal invasive species size. In each case for this 
simulation, the expected second-best subsidy exceeds the first-best subsidy (under perfect 
observability). As a result, expected home-country welfare under imperfect observability 
is lower than under perfect observability.   
For the case of imperfect observability, the foreign’s abatement effort directly 
determines the distribution of the ex post invasive-species size, and subsequently the 
subsidy level. Figure 3.1 depicts the case for the medium welfare constraint (  ̅     ) 
and low marginal abatement cost (    ). In this figure, the solid line represents the 
optimal invasive-species subsidy at different levels of invasive-species size. The dashed 
line represents the benchmark subsidy under perfect observability. Note that the solid line 
crosses the dashed line at the conditional mean invasive-species size,  (         )  
     . At this point the first- and second-best subsidies equate.  
For invasive-species sizes less than 0.617, the home country awards the foreign 
with a subsidy larger than the first-best level. In this case, the home country interprets the 
lower invasive species size as implying a higher likelihood of  high abatement effort on 
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the part of the foreign for any given draw from the distribution of random environmental 
factors. To the contrary, for invasive-species sizes larger than 0.617, the home country 
provides the foreign with a subsidy lower than the first-best level. The subsidy falls to 
zero for invasive-species sizes greater than 2.098. From the point of view of the foreign, 
with a welfare constraint of 100 and a relatively low marginal abatement cost of 5, it is ex 
ante optimal to choose an abatement effort of 1.621. Therefore, the home country induces 
the foreign to choose the ex-ante effort level and shipment size at which the home 
country maximizes its welfare. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1. The subsidy scheme with  ̅=100 and z1=5. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 displays the distribution of invasive-species size when the foreign 
chooses an abatement effort level of 1.621. The mean invasive species level is 0.617. 
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Figure 3.2. The probability density function for invasive species size when        . 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3, shows how changes in the foreign’s reservation welfare level shifts the 
optimal invasive-species subsidy curve in Figure 3.1. As reservation welfare increases 
from 80 to 110, for example, the corresponding optimal invasive-species subsidy line 
shifts upward, indicating that the home country must provide the foreign with a higher 
subsidy at each ex post invasive-species size.  
 Figure 3.4 similarly shows how a change in the foreign’s marginal abatement cost 
shifts the optimal invasive-species subsidy curve. As marginal abatement cost increases, 
the optimal invasive-species subsidy line shifts upward, implying that the home country 
must provide a larger subsidy to the foreign for any given invasive-species size.  
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Figure 3.3. The optimal subsidy with different welfare constraints. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4. The optimal subsidy with different marginal abatement costs. 
 
 
 
This simulation exercise therefore demonstrates how the optimal invasive-species 
subsidy can be used to encourage the foreign to control the invasive species at a specific 
expected level consistent with the home country’s ex ante optimum. As shown, this 
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subsidy’s expected value under uncertainty exceeds the first-best subsidy under perfect 
observability.  
 
3.3 Unobservable Abatement Effort and Multiple Foreigns 
 
The next step in our analysis is to investigate the case of two foreigns, each with 
unobservable abatement effort. Here, the home country designs separate contracts with 
each foreign, subject to the foreigns’ respective “participation” and “incentive-
compatibility” constraints. The random factors affecting the respective foreigns are 
initially assumed to be independent of each other. This assumption is relaxed in Section 4 
with the addition of a common random factor.   
The home country derives separate contracts for the foreigns by solving the 
following problem, 
                
        
    
 
  ∫  ( )  
     
 
  (     ) (     )   (     ) 
                                      ∫ (     ) 
 (     ) 
 (     )       
                                      ∫   
 (  ) 
 (     )    
                                      ∫   
 (  ) 
 (     )                                                               (3.21) 
                   ( )   [ (     )     (  )]  ∫  (  
 (  )) 
 (     )      (  )   ̅  
              (  )                         
                      
     
  [ (     )     (  )]  ∫  (  
 (  )) 
 (     )      (  ) 
                                       
Again using the first-order approach (Holmstrom, 1979), constraints (ii) are 
represented by the following four equations,  
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   (  )
   
                                                                                              (3.22) 
            ∫  ( )   
 (     )      
 (  )                                                                 (3.23)     
Letting      be the multipliers for constraints (i), and      and      the 
multipliers for constraints (3.22) and (3.23) respectively, the Lagrangian function for this 
problem can be written as 
              ( )  ∫  ( )  
     
 
  (     )(     )   (     ) 
                ∫ (     ) 
 (     ) 
 (     )              
                ∫   
 (  ) 
 (     )    ∫   
 (  ) 
 (     )    
                         ∑   { ( )  
   (  )
   
}     
                         ∑   {∫  ( )   
 (     )      
 (  )}
 
       
                ∑   {
  [ (     )     (  )]
 ∫  (  
 (  )) 
 (     )      (  )   ̅ 
}                              (3.24)                       
First-order conditions for an interior solution are (                   ), 
             
  ( )
   
  
  ( )
   
(     )        
 ( )
  ( )
   
       
 ( )
  ( )
   
   
                  {
  ( )
   
 
   
 (  )
   
 }    {
  ( )
   
}                                                         (3.25) 
            
  ( )
   
 ( )
    (     )      
 ( )  (     )      
 ( )   
 (     )                         (3.26) 
which implies 
            
 
  
 ( )
      
   
 (     )
  (     )
                                                                                       (3.27) 
and 
             
  ( )
   
  ∫ (     )   
 (     ) 
 (  |  )       ∫   
    
 (  |  )    
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                            [∫  ( )     
 (     )      
  (  )]=0                                              (3.28) 
             
  ( )
   
   [ (     )     (  )]  ∫  (  
 (  )) 
 (     )    
                            (  )   ̅                                                                                    (3.29) 
            
  ( )
   
  ( )  
   (  )
   
                                                                                      (3.30) 
            
  ( )
   
 ∫  ( )   
 (     )      
 (  )                                                             (3.31)     
Following the proof of Lemma 3.1,      and     . This result can then be used 
to derive the condition under (and the degree to) which the subsidies in this problem are 
“inefficient” from the perspective of their deviation from what would be the optimal 
subsidies under perfect observability. The subsidies,   
 (  ), are therefore second-best 
solutions due to the home-country’s need to satisfy the respective incentive constraints. 
Equations (3.27) suggest that the optimal invasive-species subsidy schedules for the two 
respective foreigns are not likely to have simple linear relationships with the foreigns’ 
respective contributions to the invasive species level, i.e., the schedules    
 (  ) are 
potentially complicated functions of             
Similar to the simulation exercise undertaken in section 3.2, we now demonstrate 
how separate invasive-species control subsidies can be used to induce the two foreigns to 
(ex ante) optimally control their respective contributions to the home country’s invasive 
species level. The two foreigns are assumed to be identical. This symmetry assumption 
does not alter the qualitative findings of the simulation exercise.  Instead, it enables a nice 
comparison with the previous simulation analysis for the single foreign case. The 
corresponding functions are summarized in the Table 3.3. 
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Table 3.3 
Simulation functions for the two foreigns (i=1,2.). 
No. 
Function 
Name 
Description Function 
1  ( ) Price of the tradable commodity   ( )       (     ) 
2  ( ) 
Home country’s damage from the 
invasive species level 
 ( )    (     )
  
3   ( ) 
Foreign’s welfare from the profit of 
exporting shipment    
  ( )    
 ( (     )     (  ))  
4   ( ) Foreign’s welfare from the subsidy    (  
 ( ))   √  
 ( ) 
5   ( ) Foreign's producing cost    ( )    
    
   
  
6   ( ) Foreign’s abatement cost    ( )    
   
  
7   (     ) 
Probability distribution functions for 
invasive species 
  (     )     
      
 
 
 
Table 3.4 
Simulation results for the two foreign cases. 
Items 
Welfare constraint        
(when z1=5) 
Abatement cost               
( when  ̅=100) 
Low 
 ̅=80 
Medium     
 ̅=100 
Low 
 ̅=110 
Low     
z1=5 
Medium   
z1=10 
High      
z1=15 
Tradable commodity 
shipment size    
33.3 33.3 33.3 33.3 33.3 33.3 
Tradable commodity 
equilibrium price P 
1,333 1,333 1,333 1,333 1,333 1,333 
Abatement effort level     1.683 1.639 1.619 1.639 1.336 1.183 
Multipliers    46.523 56.164 61.001 56.164 58.373 59.948 
Multipliers    8.493 7.958 7.689 7.958 7.835 7.747 
Multipliers    23.823 22.034 21.237 22.034 23.861 24.862 
Expected subsidy  (  ( )) 2,365 3,335 3,893 3,335 3,726 4,035 
First-best subsidy    2,164 3,154 3,721 3,154 3,407 3,594 
Expected welfare E(W) 15,241 13,185 12,013 13,185 11,274 9,730 
First-best welfare W 15,641 13,546 12,357 13,546 11,912 10,614 
 
 
 
To begin, the parameters are set as  ̅                              
                                           . Next, corresponding results 
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are derived based upon two different levels of the foreign’s reservation welfare 
constraints and marginal abatement costs. Results are summarized in Table 3.4.  
As expected, the symmetry assumption results in identical variable values across 
the two foreigns. In the optimal solution, the foreigns export approximately a total of 67 
commodity units per shipment to the home country. Due to the downward-sloping 
aggregate demand and increasing production cost assumptions in this model, each foreign 
exports less than that in the single foreign case. Yet the total amount exported increases 
from 40 to roughly 67 units. 
The corresponding equilibrium price decreases from $1600 (the price in the single 
foreign case) to $1333. Compared to the single foreign case, both foreigns s offer higher 
respective abatement efforts. But the mean invasive species size arriving at the home 
country is nevertheless larger with two foreigns than with one. This result comes about 
because with the lower equilibrium price per shipment, the home country gains greater 
welfare through the importation of more commodities, and, all else equal, is therefore 
willing to bear higher invasive-species damage. At the same time, the home country 
offers higher subsidies to each foreign than in the single foreign case.  As a result, the 
increase in welfare from larger importation of the tradable commodity offsets the 
decrease in welfare from the higher level of invasive species damage and the higher 
abatement subsidy. The home country’s welfare based on trade with two foreigns, rather 
than with only one, increases.  
As in the single foreign case, changes in the foreign’s respective reservation 
welfare levels and marginal abatement cost parameters do not affect their respective 
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optimal shipment sizes. However, these changes do influence their abatement effort 
levels. In particular, as  ̅       , increases, each foreign’s abatement effort decreases. 
Also, each foreign chooses a lower level of abatement when confronted with a higher 
marginal abatement cost parameter. In these cases, their expected subsidies increase as 
well.  
In Figure 3.5, the solid line again represents the optimal subsidy (provided per 
foreign) for different levels of invasive species size. The dashed line is a benchmark 
representing the first-best (perfect observability) subsidy. The solid line crosses the 
dashed line at the conditional mean of the invasive-species size,  (           )  
     . At this point the first-best and second best subsidies are equated. Compared to the 
single foreign case, each of the two foreign’s abatement efforts increases to 1.639 from 
1.621, and the mean invasive species level decreases to 0.61 from 0.617, respectively. 
But the total potential expected invasive species level increases for the home country. 
Figure 3.6 displays the invasive-species size distribution when foreign country i 
chooses abatement effort at 1.639. The mean invasive species size at this abatement level 
is 0.610.  
Figure 3.7 shows how a change in the foreign country’s reservation welfare level 
shifts the optimal invasive-species subsidy curve. When reservation welfare increases 
from 80 to 110 units, the optimal subsidy lines shift upward. This means that the home 
country must provide the foreign country with a larger subsidy at each invasive-species 
size as reservation welfare increases.  
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Figure 3.8 similarly shows how the change in marginal abatement control cost 
shifts the optimal invasive-species subsidy curve. When an foreign country faces a higher 
marginal abatement control cost, the home country’s optimal subsidy line shifts upward, 
i.e., the home country must compensate the foreign country with a higher subsidy at each 
invasive-species size in order to encourage the foreign country to control the invasive 
species size at the optimal level.  
This simulation exercise shows that when trading with multiple foreigns in the face 
of independent random factors, an optimal set of invasive-species subsidies can still be 
implemented by the home country. However, the home country must offer a higher 
subsidy per foreign than first-best in order to compensate for the risk incurred by the 
foreigns. In the next section, a common random factor is also assumed to affect the 
abatement-effort/invasive-species relationships for each of the foreigns along the lines of 
Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983). A tournament scheme is investigated as a possible solution 
to the invasive-species problem.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5. The optimal subsidy schedule for foreign i with  ̅ =100 and   
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Figure 3.6. The conditional probability density function for Ii given         . 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.7. The optimal subsidy for foreign i for different reservation welfare levels. 
 
 
 
 -
 0.50
 1.00
 1.50
 2.00
 -  0.40  0.80  1.20  1.60  2.00  2.40
P
(x
) 
Probability density function 
f(I|g)
I 
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
0.00 0.40 0.80 1.20 1.60 2.00 2.40
S
u
b
si
d
y
 $
 
Subsidy - Different welfare contraints 
Subsidy- ubar=110
First-best Subsidy- ubar=110
Subsidy - ubar=100
First-best Subsidy - ubar=100
Subsidy- ubar=80
First-best Subsidy - ubar=80
I 
64 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.8. The optimal subsidy for foreign i with different marginal abatement cost 
    parameters. 
 
 
 
4. The Case of a Common Random Factor 
 
As Theorem 1 in Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) shows, separate contracts are indeed 
ex ante optimal in the presence of independent random effects. In a more general setting, 
however, not only independent, but also common random factors, such as climate change, 
technological progress, and transitions in the global economic environment, can 
simultaneously affect the ability of a group of foreigns’ abatement efforts to impact an 
invasive species size. These types of global or regional factors are examples of the 
common random factors considered in a more general framework by Green and Stokey 
(1983) and Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983). 
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We begin with the assumption of two identical, risk-averse foreigns that export a 
homogeneous commodity to the home country.
22
 In addition to an individualistic random 
factor that determines the effectiveness of each foreign’s control effort,    (     .), an 
“environmental” factor,  , accounts for common randomness in both foreigns’  control 
effectiveness. For instance,   can represent general weather patterns across both foreigns, 
and     the particular weather conditions faced by foreign  . The home country is capable 
of observing each foreign’s invasive-species contamination level,   , which is 
nevertheless a random function of its unobserved abatement effort,   , as a result of    
and  . We further assume that,  
                 (   )                                                                                                    (3.32) 
where 
   (   )
 (   )
  , 
    (   )
 (   )
    , and  
   (   )           As in Section 3, the 
greater the abatement effort, the smaller the invasive species size (nevertheless at a 
decreasing rate of return), all else equal.  
Following Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983), the home country and foreigns sign either 
bilateral or multilateral (i.e., tournament) contracts, whichever the case may be, before 
  and   are known (but given that the distributions of    and   are common knowledge). 
In designing the tournament’s prizes, the home country anticipates the reactions of the 
foreigns with respect to their respective choices of optimal shipment sizes and abatement 
efforts. Assume  (  )     (    )   , and  
 (  )     (             ), where 
                                                 
22
 In keeping with Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983), we again assume identical exporters. When the home 
country faces heterogeneous exporters, the basic conclusions reached here may be unchanged in a 
qualitative sense.  
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 ( )  and   ( ) represent the expectation and variance operators, respectively. 23 Further, 
 ( )   , and   ( )     Let  (  ) and  (  )  represent the probability density and 
cumulative probability functions for   , respectively.
24
 Let  ( ) be the probability density 
function for  . It is assumed that the variances of    and   are both large enough to have 
sufficient effects on optimal invasive-species control undertaken by the two foreigns, 
respectively. 
As implied by the analysis in Section 3.1, if the home country can perfectly observe 
both    and  , a first-best optimum can be determined by providing foreign-specific 
subsidies, which are determined solely by the respective foreigns’  abatement efforts.25 
Appealing to the analysis of Section 3, optimal subsidies are ultimately determined by 
equation (3.8),   
 (  )    
  { ̅   (  )    ( (     )     (  ))} (which is explicitly 
derived below).  
As discussed in that section, the home country sets the subsidies such that foreign   
just obtains its reservation welfare level,  ̅ . With the optimal subsidy included as a 
constraint, optimal abatement effort,   
 , is solved by maximizing the home country’s 
welfare, 
               
    
  ∫  ( )  
     
 
  (     )(     )   (     ) 
                       ∫∫∫ (∑ (  (   )
 
      )) (  ) (  ) ( )             
                      ∑   
  { ̅    (  )    ( (     )     (  ))}
 
   , 
                                                 
23
 We assume that    and    are independent random variables, i.e. foreign i' s random factor does not 
affects foreign j’s,  therefore the covariance of two random factors is zero. 
24
 Because the two exporters are identical, the distributions of    and    are per force assumed to be the 
same as well. 
25
 This result follows because with perfect observability η effectively becomes a constant in the home 
country’s problem. 
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                   s.t.  (     )  
   (  )
   
  . 26                                                              (3.33) 
Letting    represent the multipliers on the foreigns’ respective first-order constraints, the 
Lagrangian function for this problem may be written as,  
        ( )  ∫  ( )  
     
 
  (     )(     )   (     ) 
                     ∫∫∫ (∑ (  (   )
 
      )) (  ) (  ) ( )             
                     ∑   
  { ̅   (  )    ( (     )     (  ))}
 
    
                       ( (     )  
   (  )
   
) 
which, via the inverse function rule, results in the following first-order conditions for the 
choice of gi,   
              ∫∫∫
 (  ( ))
 (   
 )
  ( ) (  ) (  ) ( )         ( 
 )  
 ( ) 
                         
 (  
 )                                                                                       (3.34) 
i.e.,   (  ( ))  
 ( )    
 (  
 ). 
At foreign i’s optimal abatement level, determined by (3.34), its marginal abatement cost 
equals expected marginal damage from the invasive species level in the home country 
caused by foreign i, valued in foreign i’s welfare units.  Again, by facing the foreigns’ 
respective reservation welfare constraints, the home country takes the foreigns’ respective 
reactions into consideration upfront. Equation (3.34) is therefore the condition for optimal 
abatement effort for both the home country and foreigns. The optimal shipment size from 
foreign   is determined by 
                                                 
26
 For the home country, the invasive species damage is determined by the random invasive-species size, 
which is decided by the exporters’ abatement efforts and the random variables. Therefore, the home 
country only can make a decision based upon expected damage. 
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The home country takes account of the foreigns’ respective optimal shipment sizes to 
satisfy 
             ( )     (  )
   
                                                                                                  (3.36) 
The first-best subsidy can therefore be written as, 
              
 (  )  {
  
  (  
 )    
  {
 ̅    (  
 )
   ( (  
    
 )  
    (  
 ))
}         
 
                                                                                       
 
                 (3.37) 
As this condition shows, in the benchmark solution with a risk-neutral home 
country and risk-averse foreign foreigns, the foreigns are provided with full insurance.
27
 
Realistically, however, the home country can observe neither the foreigns’ abatement 
efforts nor the individualistic and common random factors. In the face of this uncertainty, 
the home country can instead design a tournament scheme along the lines of Nalebuff and 
Stiglitz (1983).  
As Nalebuff and Stigliz (1983) and Green and Stokey (1983) have shown, a rank-
order tournament generally dominates individualistic contracts in the presence of a 
common random factor. A rank-order tournament is an incentive scheme in which 
participants’ rewards or penalties are based upon an ordinal ranking of their respective 
performances (in our case invasive-species contamination levels), not on the actual 
                                                 
27
 As in Section 3, foreign i chooses exactly  
 
 , thus obtaining the subsidy at the lowest possible cost to 
itself in terms of abatement effort.  
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performances themselves. Tournaments tend to be preferable when the risk associated 
with the common environmental variable, i.e.,  , is relatively large, or when the number 
of agents is large. In this section, a rank-order tournament is developed along the lines of 
Nalebuff and Stigliz (1983) for invasive species border control in the presence of 
unobservable abatement efforts among the foreigns.
28
 
Let the “winner” foreign’s subsidy be denoted   , and the “loser’s”   , where the 
winner is the foreign with the lower invasive-species size. As shown by Nalebuff and 
Stiglitz (1983), in this case the winner is rewarded more than its performance would 
otherwise merit, in an attempt to motivate greater abatement efforts among both agents. 
The winner and loser are determined by both their respective abatement levels and the 
draws of both the individualistic and common random factors. Even in the case of 
symmetric agents, the tournament will distinguish a winner and a loser. However, the 
expected prize is the same for each agent. 
 For uniformity with the individualistic subsidy scheme in Section 3, let        
equal the sum of the expected subsidies calculated under perfect observability.  That is, 
                   ∑   
  (  
 )     
                            ∑   
  { ̅    (  
 )    ( (  
    
 )  
    (  
 ))}                          (3.38) 
Following Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983), let 
             ̅  
     
 
   
              
     
 
                                                                                                           (3.39) 
                                                 
28
 We do not derive ex ante  optimal individual contracts in this case of both individualistic and common 
random factors due to (1) the more general results of Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) and  Green and Stokey 
(1983) showing the superiority of tournaments, and (2) space limitations. 
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where  ̅ is the average subsidy, or “safe income,” and r is the risk associated with 
participating in the tournament.  
The foreigns’ expected welfares are, respectively, functions of the probabilities of 
their winning the tournament. A foreign’s winning probability depends not only on its 
abatement effort, but also on its opponent’s abatement effort, as well as   and   . For 
given distributions of    and  , let   (       ) represent foreign i' s probability of  
winning the tournament.  Foreign i’s expected welfare function can then be written as,  
              
    
     ( (     )     (  ))    ( )  ( ̅   ) 
                               (    ( ))  ( ̅   )    (  )                                                      (3.40) 
As before, the foreign will choose its optimal shipment size,   , according to 
equation (3.36), i.e., 
             ( )  
  (  )
   
                                                                                                  (3.41) 
As Nalebuff and Stigliz (1983) point out, by rewarding agents on the basis of a 
contest, the individualistic random term, θi , is effectively replaced in the agent’s 
expected welfare function by the new disturbance term r. In the context of our problem, 
   is by definition uncorrelated with abatement effort   , but   is not. If a foreign 
implements more abatement effort, the probability of winning   increases. After 
observing  , foreigns  choose their respective abatement efforts according to, 
            
   ( )
   
      
 (  )=0                                                                                          (3.42) 
where       ( ̅   )    ( ̅   )   
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This equation represents the rule followed by the foreign in choosing its abatement 
effort.    is the welfare surplus associated with winning the competition. Thus, 
   ( )
   
   
represents the marginal welfare surplus associated with abatement effort. The foreigns 
therefore choose their respective optimal abatement efforts up to the point where the 
marginal disutility (or cost) of abatement effort equals the marginal welfare surplus from 
participating in the tournament. 
As Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) point out, these equations can be thought of as the 
reaction functions for the two agents, i.e.,   (  ) and   (  ), which, under certain 
circumstances, lead to a symmetric equilibrium, i.e,  (  )   (  ) (see footnote 3 in 
Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) for further discussion). In our case, each foreign chooses 
   based upon its observation of    and  . Thus,    will not necessarily equal           
       , for any given tournament. 
If foreign   is to “beat” foreign  , it must satisfy 
              (   )       (   )                                                                                (3.43) 
The probability of this occurring for a given θ2 is  
             (  (   )   (   )    )                                                                                 (3.44) 
To calculate the probability of foreign 1 winning the tournament, we therefore solve,  
              ( )  ∫ (  (   )   (   )    ) (  )                                                   (3.45) 
Thus, as Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) show, at the symmetric equilibrium,  (  )  
 (  )    
          . In our case, a symmetric equilibrium means that both the 
probability of winning the prize,     and the expected subsidy are the same for each 
foreign. However, due to the identical-foreign assumption, the foreign with higher 
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abatement effort is more likely to win. However, the winning foreign will incur higher 
abatement cost at the same time. 
Using (3.45), foreign 1’s probability of winning changes with respect to its 
abatement effort according to,  
            
   ( )
   
   
   (   )
 (   )
∫  (  ) (  )      
   (   )
 (   )
  ̅                                     (3.46) 
where  ̅   [ ( )]. 
Substituting (3.46) into (3.42) yields  
              
   (   )
 (   )
  ̅    (  )                                                                                 (3.47) 
Equation (3.47) is identical to fundamental equation (17) in Nalebuff and Stigliz 
(1983), given the non-linearity of function   (   ). Given this non-linearity, each 
foreign’s abatement effort is dependent upon   after observing   and   . However, the 
two identical foreigns have the same winning probabilities, and each foreign’s expected 
subsidy will be the same. If r is now set according to, 
              ̅   (  ( )  ( ))                                                                                        (3.48) 
then equation (3.34) is replicated and first-best abatement efforts are chosen by both 
foreigns.  Any    and    that together determine the r satisfying (3.48) and (3.38) are 
optimal from the home country’s perspective. As shown by Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983), 
due to the risk associated with participating in the tournament, each agent’s welfare does 
not equate with its first-best level, but expected welfare is the welfare obtained under the 
first-best subsidy. Further, the higher the tournament risk, r, the more incentive each 
agent has to increase their abatement effort. This leads to Lemma 3.2. 
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Lemma 3.2 . The foreign’s abatement effort is positively correlated with the size of 
the winning prize. 
The proof for this lemma is readily seen. Applying the implicit function theorem to 
(3.47) at equilibrium results in      
            
   
 
  
 
  
  (   
 )
 (   
 )
 ̅(  ( ̅  )   ( ̅  ))
  
   (   
 )
 (   
 )
  ̅    
  (  )
                                                                   (3.49) 
and via (3.39), in particular the definition of  , the winning prize is in turn positively 
correlated with  . 
For purposes of numerical simulation, let the home country’s welfare and invasive 
species damage functions, the foreigns’ welfare and cost functions, as well as the 
invasive-species size with respect to the abatement effort functions be as shown in Table 
3.5. 
 
 
Table 3.5 
Functions for a tournament simulation (i=1,2.). 
No. 
Function 
Name 
Description Function 
1  ( ) Price of the tradable commodity   ( )       (     ) 
2  ( ) 
Home country’ damage from an 
invasive species 
29
 
 ( )    (     )  
3   ( ) ForeignForeign's welfare from the 
profit of exporting its commodity 
  ( )    
 ( (     )     (  ))  
4   ( ) 
Foreign's welfare from the home 
country’s subsidy 
   (  
 ( ))   √  
 ( ) 
5   ( ) Foreign's producing cost    ( )    
    
   
  
6   ( ) Foreign's abatement cost    (  )    
   
  
7   (  ) Foreign’s invasive-species size 30   (   )       √      ,    [  
  
  
(
  
  
)
 
]. 
                                                 
29
 To simplify the calculation, a linear damage function is adopted here. 
30
 The up bound of the abatement effort is set to guarantee the nonnegative invasive species size. 
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The probability density function defined over the common factor is assume to be 
uniform with a mean of 1,  
             ( )  {
                                
 
 
   
 
 
  
                        
 
 
       
 
 
  
. 
Similarly, the probability density functions of the respective individualistic random 
factors are assumed to be uniform with zero means,
31
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. 
The expected invasive species size is therefore, 
             (  (   ))  ∫ ∫ (     √      )
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
     
 
 
 
 
. 
Here, the maximum mean of invasive species size from foreign   is represented by 
  , i.e., the size corresponding to  zero abatement effort on the part of foreign  . As  ’s 
abatement effort increases, its expected invasive species size decreases, but at a 
decreasing rate. Letting               , the green line in Figure 3.9 illustrates how 
the expected invasive species size from foreign   changes with respect to the its 
abatement effort. 
 
                                                 
31
 In Section 3, we assumed exponential density functions for the two exporters. Uniform densities are 
assumed here for tractability purposes.  
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Figure 3.9. Expected invasive species size with respect to abatement effort. 
 
 
 
The parameter values for this simulation exercise are set at  ̅             
               
          
            
                        
      
   . Corresponding results for the benchmark case of perfect observability (using 
individualized contracts) are then calculated for the cases of three different foreign 
reservation utility levels (assuming marginal abatement cost is fixed at     ) and three 
different marginal abatement cost parameters (assuming reservation utility is fixed at 
100). Results are presented in Table 3.6. 
When  ̅      and   
   , optimal (symmetric) shipment size is 33. The home 
country effectively determines the optimal abatement levels, at which the marginal 
damage of the invasive species level, valued in the foreigns’ welfare units, equals the 
foreigns’ respective marginal costs of abatement. Optimal abatement efforts are 0.970, 
and the subsidy is set at $2,683 per foreign. As expected, higher reservation welfare 
levels lead to a decrease in optimal abatement effort (referring to columns 2-4), as does a 
higher marginal abatement cost parameter. 
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Tournament risk for this simulation exercise, r, is derived from Equation (3.48). 
Corresponding winning and losing rewards, or subsidies, are then calculated for the same 
three foreign reservation utility levels (assuming marginal abatement cost is fixed at 
    ) and three marginal abatement cost parameters (assuming reservation utility is 
fixed at 100) as in Table 3.6. The tournament results are presented in Table 3.7.  
Similar to previous results, as foreigns increase their abatement efforts, the 
expected invasive-species size, and thus damage suffered by the home country, decreases. 
As shown above, the home country can choose a risk level for the foreigns such that a 
simple tournament between the foreigns results in the first-best level of abatement efforts. 
Comparing Table 3.7 with Table 3.6, the home country, without observation of the 
foreigns’ abatement efforts, can realize the first-best level of welfare by using a 
tournament, indicating that a tournament scheme reveals more information about the 
individualistic and common random factors.  
 
 
Table 3.6 
Simulation results for the first-best benchmark solution (i=1,2.). 
Variables 
Minimum welfare            
(when z1=5) 
Abatement cost             
(when   ̅     ) 
Low 
 ̅     
Medium     
 ̅      
Low 
 ̅      
Low     
  
    
Medium   
  
     
High      
  
     
Tradable commodity 
shipment size (  ) 
33 33 33 33 33 33 
Abatement effort level (  ) 1.106 0.970 0.915 0.970 0.614 0.470 
Mean invasive species size 
 (  ) 
3.960 4.026 4.054 4.026 4.225 4.322 
Subsidy   
 (  ) 1,807 2,683 3,196 2,683 2,635 2,612 
Expected welfare  ( ) 10,726 8,627 7,470 8,627 7,968 7,763 
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Table 3.7 
Simulation results for the tournament scheme (i=1,2.). 
Variables 
Minimum welfare          
(when z1=5) 
Abatement cost             
(when  ̅     ) 
Low 
 ̅     
Medium     
 ̅      
High 
 ̅      
Low     
  
    
Medium   
  
     
High      
  
     
Tradable commodity 
shipment size (  ) 
33 33 33 33 33 33 
Abatement effort level (  ) 1.106 0.970 0.915 0.970 0.614 0.470 
Mean invasive species size 
E(  ) 
3.960 4.026 4.054 4.026 4.225 4.322 
Expected welfare  ( ) 10,726 8,627 7,470 8,627 7,968 7,763 
Tournament risk ( ) 810.87 823.22 826.22 823.22 822.85 822.66 
Subsidy   
 (  ) 1,807 2,683 3,196 2,683 2,635 2,612 
Winning subsidy   
 (  )    2,617 3,506 4,023 3,506 3,458 3,434 
Losing subsidy     
 (  )    996 1,859 2,370 1,859 1,812 1,789 
 
 
 
 It is interesting to note from Table 3.7 that the tournament risk necessary to 
achieve the first-best solution values is relatively large, as indicated by the gaps between 
the winning and losing subsidies. For example, when  ̅      and   
    the gap is 
approximately 811 units. Similar-sized gaps are reported for the other parameter 
combinations included in the table. However, as indicated the table, the gaps as 
percentages of the losing subsidies decrease quite dramatically with increases in 
reservation utility levels, reflecting the need for the home country to lower the downside 
risk of the tournament as the opportunity costs of foreigns’ increases. To the contrary, the 
gaps as percentages of losing subsidies are relatively unchanged with increases in the 
marginal abatement cost parameter, suggesting that the home country does not need to be 
as sensitive to changes in downside risk associated with increases in the foreigns’ 
marginal abatement costs. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
This paper’s main contribution to the invasive species border control literature – a 
literature that has heretofore focused almost exclusively on the use of tariffs and 
inspection as predominant control policies – is the investigation of two alternative 
policies that directly influence a foreign country’s abatement effort – contracts and 
tournaments. Our framework for contracts is provided by Holmstrom (1979), while the 
framework for tournaments is provided by Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) and Green and 
Stokey (1983). Both frameworks accommodate uncertainty in the abatement process of a 
foreign country.  
As taught by Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) and Green and Stokey (1983), the type of 
uncertainty faced by the home country governs its choice of policy instrument. When the 
environmental randomness that inhibits the home country’s ability to observe a foreign’s 
abatement effort is specific to that foreign (and thus strictly independent across foreigns), 
bilateral contracts between the home country and respective foreigns are sufficient for 
obtaining an ex ante optimal invasive species level in the home country. However, when 
the randomness has both independent and common components, a rank-order tournament 
is able to leverage the common component and induce first-best abatement efforts by the 
foreigns. We derive these analytical results in the specific context of the invasive species 
problem.  
In addition, we numerically analyze the contract and tournament models in this 
context by considering three general cases. In the first two cases, where the random factor 
is foreign-specific and independent across foreigns, we analyze bilateral contracts 
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provided by the home country to a single and to two foreigns, respectively. In the single 
foreign case, we find that the home country’s subsidy is increasing in both the foreign’s 
marginal abatement cost and reservation welfare level. These results also hold in the case 
of two foreigns, however the home country imports a larger quantity of the tradable 
commodity (and thus a larger quantity of the invasive species) as the commodity’s 
equilibrium price falls. In each case, the expected second-best subsidy exceeds the first-
best subsidy (under perfect observability). As a result, expected home-country welfare 
under imperfect observability is lower.  
In the third case we assess the effectiveness of a tournament in achieving the home 
country’s first-best solution to the invasive species problem in the face of both foreign-
specific and common random factors.  Our main finding is that the tournament risk (or 
gap between the winning and losing subsidies) as a percentage of the losing subsidy 
decreases quite dramatically with increases in the reservation utility levels of the foreigns, 
reflecting the need for the home country to lower the downside risk of the tournament as 
the opportunity costs of foreigns increases. To the contrary, the gap as a percentage of the 
losing subsidy is relatively insensitive to increases in the marginal abatement cost 
parameter, suggesting that in designing its tournament scheme the home country does not 
need to be as sensitive to changes in the downside risk associated with increases in the 
foreigns’ marginal abatement costs. 
The study of invasive species border control is complex, and as a result several 
issues remain for future research. Nalebuff and Stigliz (1983) show that introducing a 
threshold gap (in our case between the respective foreigns’ contributions to the home 
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country’s invasive species level), with a subsidy bonus contingent upon meeting this 
threshold gap, can improve the tournament scheme. In the spirit of Nalebuff and Stiglitz 
(1983), a natural “next step” would therefore be to determine the optimal “threshold gap” 
in an invasive-species tournament. 
A second logical step would be to link the contract and tournament schemes, which 
are border control policies, with policies aimed at reducing the spread of an invasive 
species once it has been introduced in the home country. It is important to note that the 
border-control policies explored in this paper assume a non-zero optimal invasive species 
size. Our model therefore abstracts from explicit mechanisms that are required to 
optimally contain the spread of the invasive species within the home country’s borders. 
Presumably a joint policy that explicitly accounts for the dynamics of the invasive species 
spread, both temporally and spatially, is ultimately required. This policy would include 
schemes such as contracts, tournaments, or tariffs to control the invasive species level at 
the border, and then perhaps taxes or subsidies levied on private and public landowners 
within the home country to control the species’ spread internally. Models addressing the 
spread of invasive species are in the early stages of development (see for instance, Sharov 
and Liebhod, 1998; Horan and Wolf, 2005; Rich et al., 2005; Kim et al., 2006; Wilen, 
2007; Burnett et al., 2008; Olson and Roy, 2010; Finnoff et al., 2011; Homans and Horie, 
2011; Sims and Finnoff, 2012). These models are likely candidates for linkage with the 
border control models developed in this paper.  
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CHAPTER 4                                                                                                                        
SPATIAL-DYNAMIC EXTERNALITIES AND COORDINATION IN INVASIVE 
SPECIES CONTROL 
 
Abstract 
 
Invasive species are causing tremendous losses in the US, while several billions of 
dollars in control costs are spent on decreasing the spread of invasive species. Since 
species invasions impact large spatial areas, these control costs and damages are incurred 
by multiple participants, e.g., land owners, regional government, countries. We integrate 
ecological and economic processes to study a spatial externality common in the control of 
an established invasive species. The model considers an invasive species spreading across 
a number of individual participants who each engage in costly control actions that lower 
the rate of spread.  The individualistic optimum control strategy is solved through 
backward induction by a chain of individual optimal control process. We find that the 
optimal response to invasion (eradicating, stopping, or ignoring invasion) is determined 
by the incremental damage of invasion and the marginal control cost. In the stopping case, 
the steady-state invasion area is positively related to the discount rate and the marginal 
control cost, negatively related to marginal damage, but not related to the initial invaded 
area. The change in the optimal control rate directly relates to the state of the invasion 
and its shadow cost. The fundamental reason for the spatial externality is that society and 
the individual participants differ in concern to the damage caused by an invasive species. 
Specifically, different spatial scales lead to a divergence between the control incentives of 
society and individuals, and result in a deficiency of the individual’s control 
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accompanying with a larger steady-state invasion area. I introduce a dynamic multiple-
source-subsidy scheme to internalize the externalities, which expands Wilen’s (2007) 
chained bilateral negotiation system. A numerical analysis demonstrates these theoretical 
results and then illustrates how the number, size, and spatial order of small and large 
parcel influence the severity of the externality and consequently the sufficiency of 
privately supplied invasive species control.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
Invasive species are causing tremendous losses in the US, while several billions of 
dollars in control costs are spent on decreasing the spread of invasive species (Pimentel et 
al., 2005). Invasive species control is a long-term trade-off between the flow of damages 
and relative control costs for the established invasive species. This trade-off critically 
depends on the ecological and economic factors that dictate the evolution of the invasion 
and subsequent damages (Olson and Roy, 2008). The spread of invasive species usually 
involves multiple individuals (e.g., land owners, regional government, countries), who 
may have different perspectives and actions to the invasion.
32
 According to Mas-Colell 
and others' (2009) definition of externality, an individual’s control action is a partial 
public good due to the direct effect on  other individual’s and social welfare.  Therefore, 
invasive species control distinguishes itself in the integration of the invasive species’ 
dynamics, biological interaction, environmental characteristics, and the participants’ 
dynamic behaviors.  
                                                 
32
 In this paper, individuals are all the land owners who are affected by the invasive species’ invasion. 
Decision makers refer to the social planner and the individual who is controlling the spread. Other 
individuals, who are not controlling spread at that time, are called participants or other land owners.   
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  Invasive species control is a spatial-dynamic process with multiple affected 
individuals. Although an individual focuses on his/her private benefit of control, other 
individuals and society benefit from it, e.g., the delay and reduction of other individual’s 
damages and impairment on the environment. The externality is driven by different 
spatial scale considerations which drive a wedge between an individual’s and the 
society’s damages and consequentially different shadow costs of invaded land. This leads 
to a divergence between the control incentives of society and individuals, and at last 
results in a deficiency of the individual’s control, which requires regulatory intervention.  
For example, Emerald Ash Borer (EAB), an invasive species that originated from 
Asia, was introduced to the US in cargo imported from Asia in 2002 (McCullough and 
Usborne, 2011).  It first established in southeastern Michigan, but has since been detected 
in Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, New York, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Ontario and Quebec 
(McCullough and Usborne, 2011).  EAB has caused the death and decline of tens of 
millions of U.S. ash trees. It can cause the infested ash tree to lose 30 to 50% of canopy 2 
years after infestation and die within 3 to 4 years (USDA, 2010).  
According to Sydnor et al. (2007), the complete loss of Ohio’s urban ash is 
estimated to be about $7.5 billion. It includes the loss of landscape value of the existing 
tree, the removal cost of the dead or declining tree, and replacement costs. These losses 
are considered as the direct damages from EAB in this paper. Another indirect damage, 
market damage, occurs in the invaded regions at the same time. According to Federal 
Regulations and Quarantine Notices 7 CFR 301.53-1 through 301.53-9, areas where EAB 
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has been detected may be quarantined. Therefore, ash trees are not permitted to be traded 
from quarantined areas and other ash products from infested areas are receiving a lower 
price than from uninvaded areas. Based on EAB’s spread dynamics and the 
environmental conditions of the region, the coordination of each state’s control actions 
play a crucial role in the control process, which requires the understanding of spatial 
externality and corresponding intervention.  
The next section provides a brief review of the invasive-species control literature. 
Section 3 presents a basic modeling framework.  The social optimal control process is 
illustrated in Section 4 as a benchmark for the comparison between the individual control 
relay which is set out in section 5. The comparison of individual and social control paths 
indicates the deficiency of decentralized individual control. Section 6 discusses the 
feasibility of internalizing the spatial externality of individualistic control through a 
multiple-source subsidy scheme. Section 7 demonstrates the numerical results and 
verifies the efficacy of the subsidy.  Section 8 summarizes and concludes.  
 
2. Literature Review 
 
The biological growth of the invasion, the discount rate, the control costs, and the 
damages are necessary factors in the fundamental model of invasive species control 
(Olson and Roy, 2008). Here a brief survey of the literature is provided with respect to 
the invasion pattern, damage, control process, and externality. Previous economic 
research has characterized the degree of invasion in two ways. One is based on 
population density, in which the effectiveness of control is measured as a reduction in 
invasive species numbers (Bhat et al., 1993; Bhat et al., 1996; Bicknell et al., 1999; 
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Horan and Wolf, 2005; Kim et al., 2006; Bhat and Huffaker, 2007; Burnett et al., 2008; 
Olson and Roy, 2010; Finnoff et al., 2011; Homans and Horie, 2011). Population is 
generally assumed to follow a growth process within a fixed area, such as a logistic 
growth process. For example, Burnett et al. (2008) suggest that the authority should make 
efforts to acquire an estimating number of the Brown Tree Snake existing in Hawaii in 
order to make an optimal long-term prevention and control decision. 
Another way to describe the impact of invasive species is spatial spread represented 
by an expansion of invaded area (Sharov and Liebhod, 1998; Rich et al., 2005; Hastings 
et al., 2005; Wilen, 2007; Olson and Roy, 2010; Sims and Finnoff, 2012). In this case, 
control is manifested as a reduced rate or spatial area of the invasive species spread.  
Wilen (2007)  shows that ignoring the invasion is preferred if the discounted marginal 
damage is less than marginal control cost; slowing down or eradicating the spread is 
optimal if the discounted marginal damage is higher than marginal control cost  in a 
spatial dynamic bio-invasion model.  
Sharov and Liebhold (1998) investigate the conditions which determine the best 
spread rate for managing an invasive species with a barrier zone, which focuses on 
controlling the invasion rate in the area nearest the invasion front. In the case of an 
infinite rectangular strip, they show the optimal spread rate is determined by the marginal 
barrier zone control cost and the discounted marginal damage. They find that control may 
either slow the spread of the species or reverse spread such that the species is eradicated 
but do not consider the case where the control stops the invasion. In another case of a 
limited or fixed boundary rectangular area, they find the initial invasion area determines 
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the optimal control strategy. Also they point out “stopping the spread is never an optimal 
strategy.” Due to the concavity of the control cost function and linear damage function in 
their model, control will swing from zero to the optimal control rate. The model 
presented herein considers alternative specifications of the control cost and damage 
functions which allows for stopping, slowing, or eradication of spread in the region. As a 
result, the damage and control cost (and not the initial invasion) plays a larger role in the 
control results. 
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While Sharov and Liebhold (1998) focus on a single decision maker, spatial 
externalities and the deficiency of individual abating efforts are important issues since 
species invasions impact large spatial areas with multiple participants.
34
 Externalities in 
invasive species control can be characterized into two types. A negative externality arises 
when encourages spread from neighboring areas, such as the emigration of pests from 
high-density to less-density areas (Bhat et al., 1993; Bhat et al., 1996; Bhat and Huffaker, 
2007).  A positive externality arises when benefits from the individualistic control 
spillover to others, such as the decrease or delay of other individuals’ damages (Wilen, 
2007).
35
  
                                                 
33
 Similar to Sharov and Liebhold (1998), my model also allows for the case where individuals ignore the 
invasion and perform no control.  
34
 This is true of many ecological disturbances. Hansen and Libecap (2004) study the Dust Bowl of the 
1930s and reveal the abundance of small farms in the 1930s compromised the control of wind erosion. The 
limited scale of small farmers encouraged less erosion control than larger farmers. Small farms with 
intensive cultivation and less erosion control cause increased blowing of sand to the leeward farms and 
reduce their benefits of control. The collective control necessitated the establishment of soil conservation 
districts and improved the coordination of farmer’s erosion control. In the same way, the number and size 
of participants will also influence invasive species control.  
35
 In some cases, the positive externality may include the uncompensated decrease in prevention cost which 
non-invaded individuals incur. For example, in the Chicago Sanitary and Shipping canal an electrical 
barrier has been built to prevent the spread of Asia carps into the Great Lakes (Oregon Sea Grant). If the 
control of Asian carp is implemented effectively on invaded areas of the river, the cost of preventing 
invasion into the Great lakes may decrease. 
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Rich et al. (2005) investigate the negative regional externalities associated with 
control of foot and mouth disease (FMD) in South America. They find regional control of 
FMD spread is influenced by the spatial spillover from neighboring regions which 
perform less control. Their simulation shows how neighbors with low incentive to control 
encourage the high incentive individuals to switch their high-effort strategy to low-effort. 
Bhat et al. (1996) provide an overview of three scenarios about controlling nuisance 
wildlife (beaver) which can migrate from high to low population-density.  In scenario one, 
one parcel owner takes the beaver population level of the neighbor as a second state 
variable and performs “unilateral management” while another adjacent parcel owner does 
not control beavers and free-rides on the control of the neighbor. In scenario two, two 
owners with different optimal control levels may choose zero trapping rates in a non-
cooperative process or Pareto efficient trapping rates through a compensating transfer 
between two owners under a binding cooperative contract. In scenario three, Bhat et al. 
(1993) show that multiple landowners necessitate a centralized control strategy 
incorporating the effect of species diffusion on control.
36
  
When managing natural resources, internalizing an externality must connect the 
biological and spatial dispersal features between parcels. Sanchirico and Wilen (1999) 
investigate effects of the biological and the economic linkages, which originate from the 
spatial and economic heterogeneity, on the dynamic equilibrium of open access 
                                                 
36
 Bhat and Huffaker (2007) expand the bilateral strategy of control a nuisance and show the instability of 
ex ante self-enforcing cooperative contracts. The existence of maximum payoffs from breaking the contract 
after cooperating causes the termination of contract. This termination decision is determined by the 
trapping technology, the preferred population level, and the discount rate.  They propose a variable transfer 
payment agreement, which is attained through renegotiating and aiming at compensating the owners who 
gain less with cooperative control.   
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exploitation. They show that the economic behavior can be influenced by biological 
systems nested within patches, which can be independent from other patches or partially 
or fully interacted with other patches. Sanchirico and Wilen (2005) prove that spatially 
uniform policies (such as a landing tax and tax on effort) on patches with different 
biological dispersal patterns, result in lower rent, non-optimal effort distribution, and 
inefficient biomass levels.  
Though Wilen (2007) points out the existence of a spatial externality in invasive 
species control he does not provide a formal analysis. The fundamental reason for the 
externality is that the social planner and the individual participants differ in concern to 
the damage caused by an invasive species.  As discussed previously, the outbreak of 
invasive species may cause economic losses and environmental damages (Pimentel et al., 
2005).  Economic damages represent the pecuniary losses from the reduction in 
production and market value of commodities and the expense of a remediation cost (not 
to be confused with control cost). Environmental damages may include health risks to 
humans and wildlife, the loss of biological diversity, the reduction of ecosystem service, 
etc. (Daszak et al., 2000).  The social planner accounts for all economic damages and 
environment damages, while the individual considers only his or her economic losses.
37
   
Perrings et al. (2002) notes that invasive species control is a public good which 
depends on the least effective individual participant, the “weakest-link.” Wilen (2007) 
                                                 
37 For example, Horan and Wolf (2005) show that foot and mouth disease, bovine TB (tuberculosis), and 
other diseases may cause (1) losses due to the death of livestock and the reduction of meat from infected 
livestock, etc.; (2) loss associated with the imposition of trade sanctions on the disease outbreak regions; (3) 
threats to human health; and (4) threats to wildlife. The social planner considers these losses as the social 
damages caused by TB, while an individual only includes his/her own individual economic losses, i.e. 
reduction of production, decrease in market value and other losses. Bicknell et al. (1999) show similar 
factors prevent individual livestock producers from eradicating diseases in their own herd. 
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suggests this externality can be internalized with chained bilateral negotiation.  The 
farthest non-invaded parcel owner, N, may offer his/her neighbor, N-1, a payment to 
motivate more control and reduce the spread rate, and then the parcel owner N-1 
continues to negotiate with N-2, then continue till to parcel owner 1. But the information 
of spread may limit in a neighborhood range. Therefore, a partial or myopic “chained 
bilateral negotiation” occurs within the neighborhood areas. Wilen (2007) also points out 
transactions costs may impede first-best negotiation. To sum up, the invasive species 
control with multiple participants is not addressed adequately in the literature. In this 
essay, a control and subsidy scheme is provided with the coordination of authority. 
 
3. Modeling a Species Invasion 
 
 
 
Table 4.1 
Variables in theoretical model. 
Variable  Definition 
 ( ) A state variable- the invasion area at time   
  [ ( )] The percentage of land invaded in parcel   at time   
 ( ) A social control variable- the social control rate at time   
  ( ) Individual  ’s control rate at time   
 ( ) 
A social costate variable- the social shadow cost of an 
incremental increase in invasion at time   
  ( ) 
A costate variable of individualistic control- individual  ’s 
shadow cost of an incremental increase in invasion at time   
     The time of invasion reaching the west border of parcel   
   The time of invasion reaching the east border of parcel   
   
  
The time of reaching steady-state within parcel   under the 
individualistic control relay 
    The time of reaching steady-state under social control 
    The steady-state of invaded area under social control 
   
  
The steady-state of invaded area under the individualistic 
control relay 
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In this paper, the analysis is concentrated on the control of terrestrial invasive 
species. Although aquatic invasive species have biological spreading characteristics 
which differ from terrestrial invasive species, the basic control rule is the same as the 
control of terrestrial invasive species. For convenience, the definition of each variable in 
the model is summarized in Table 4.1.  
 
3.1 The Invasion Spread and Control Types 
 
Assume I individually owned parcels of land in units of square kilometers are 
adjoined in a rectangular strip area, labeled as 1 to I from west to east (see Figure 4.1). 
The width of the rectangle is normalized to one. Hereafter let “parcel” refer to the single 
piece of land owned by each individual owner and “region” the total area of I parcels. Let 
  represent a parcel’s length (also the area) owned by owner            , and   
∑   
 
   . The species invade from west to east along the length of the rectangle. The 
spread distance at      when the invasion is first detected is   , and  ( ) is spread 
distance at time  .       
 
  
                   
 
Figure 4.1. Species invasion across multiple management jurisdictions. 
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The status of each land parcel is described by “not invaded,” i.e., the invasion 
frontier has not yet reached the western border of parcel   ; “being invaded,” i.e., the 
invasion has reached and is spreading within parcel   ; or “fully invaded,” i.e., the 
invasive species has fully spread across parcel  . Assume   [ ( )] is the percentage of 
parcel  ’s land invaded at time t. Therefore, 
              [ ( )]  
{
 
 
 
                            ( )  ∑   
   
        
 ( ) ∑   
   
   
  
      ∑   
   
     ( )  ∑   
 
   
                                ( )  ∑   
 
   
                                      (4.1) 
The spread of an invasive species is “a process by which the species expands its 
range from a habitat in which it currently occupies to one in which it does not” and there 
are two processes: continuous spread, i.e., a local or short-range dispersal due to the 
growth of the population; and spread through long-distance dispersal, i.e., a long-range 
dispersal through human, bird, wind or other mechanisms (Liebhold and Tobin, 2008). 
Short-range dispersal exhibits a constant spread rate. Long-distance dispersal can result in 
isolated colonies, which grow and eventually merge into the main population of invasive 
species. The combination of the two processes (called stratified dispersal) causes spread 
to accelerate over time (Liebhold and Tobin, 2008). This essay assumes no new 
introductions and the invaded area increases exponentially which is consistent with a 
combination of short and long range spreading. Let      be the intrinsic constant 
spatial spread rate of the invasive species, and the invasion spread as 
  
  
   ( ), i.e., 
spread occurs exponentially and uniformly across the entire region.   
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Assume control efforts focused in a barrier zone along the edge of the expanding 
population front (Sharov and Liebhold, 1998), so the owner can take control actions only 
when his/her land is being invaded. Thus if a parcel is fully invaded, this owner stops 
control and the next one initiates control. In this way, the individual control process is 
akin to a relay. The effective spread under control is [   ( )] ( ), where  ( )    is 
the spread rate reduction at time  , a control variable. Let  ( ) represent the social control 
rate,    ( ) the individual control rate of landowner  .  
The level of control is decided by comparing the present value of flows of damage 
with control cost. There are three types of control, i.e., slowing, stopping, and reversing 
the spread of invasion (Liebhold and Tobin, 2008).  If the reduction rate of invasive 
species is less than the natural growth rate (   ( )   ), control efforts slow down but 
not stop the spread; if the reduction rate above the natural spread rate ( ( )   ) the 
invaded area decreases; and if  ( )   , the invasion is stopped. 
 
 
Table 4.2 
Possible outcomes of social control. 
Case Type Description Characteristics 
Case 1 Invasion stops within the region     ∑   
 
     
Case 2 Fully invaded region 
    ∑   
 
   , stops beyond the region                           
     , never stopping 
Case 3 Eradication          
 
 
 
Based on the results of social control, there are three cases for the terminal 
condition, summarized in Table 4.2. The first case is when the steady-state invaded area 
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is smaller than the region, i.e., it is optimal to preserve a portion of the region from the 
social planner’s perspective. The second case is the eventual complete invasion of the 
region. This case arises when the steady-state of invaded area is larger than the region, or 
when no steady-state exists.  The third case corresponds to the “reversing” type where the 
damage of invasion is so high that eradication is the optimal strategy, the steady-state 
approaches the west border of the region.
 38
 The difference between the individual and 
social control path is manifested as different steady-states of invaded area and different 
times when that steady-state is reached. This essay focuses on the first case since both the 
individual and social control reaches its steady-state within the region. The other two 
cases can be derived directly from the first case.
39
 
 
3.2 The Damage and Control Cost 
 
As discussed before, invasive species’ spread can cause physical damages to 
valuable commodities, market damages, and environmental damages. The physical 
damages refer to the production damage from crop death or produce decline. For example, 
Rice Water Weevil causes an average of 7% yield loss ($64.05 /acre) in the US (Hummel 
N., 2009), and about 10%-20% yield loss in the north of China (Yu et al., 2008).  Market 
damage results from the price effect and the restricted market effects. Consumers may 
                                                 
38
 It is not mathematically possible to get x equal 0, but very small values of   are possible. When   reaches 
a very small value at which the sustainable spread of the invasive species is not possible, we consider the 
invasion is eradicated. 
39
 In case 2, the whole region is fully invaded regardless of the externality, and only the time when the 
region becomes fully invaded is different between the individual control and the social control. In this case, 
the social planner is able to delay the inevitable (McIntosh et al., 2010). In case 3, if it is also optimal for 
the individual control relay to eradicate the invasion, there is just a time difference between the individual 
and social control to reverse the invasion back to the west border of the region. But if it is not optimal for 
the individual control to eradicate the invasion, the difference will be no invasion versus partial invasion.  
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consider commodities from the region of invasion outbreak as damaged goods resulting 
in a lower the price. Product bans or quarantines will also limit markets. Due to limited 
information, the commodities from non-invaded parcels of the region cannot be 
distinguished from the invaded parcels; therefore, market damages occur to all parcels in 
the region.  
The physical and market damages are shown in Figure 4.2. As invasion occurs, 
physical damages result in a decline in production captured by an upward shift in the 
supply curve from   to   . The market reaction to the invasion is captured by lower 
demand for commodities from the invaded region and represents a downward shift of 
demand curve (  to   ). The physical or production effect only impacts invaded 
landowners, but the market effect impacts the whole region.  Environmental damages 
refer to losses unrelated to the commodity market such as impacts to the ecosystem or 
human health, which are considered public losses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        
 
 
                           
Figure 4.2. The production effect and the market effect. 
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The damage function captures the physical, market, and environmental damages 
which are all functions of the size of invasion  ( ). The land scales (   or  ) considered 
by the individuals   and the society are important factors in individual and the social 
damages. Let  [ ( )  ] represent the social damages caused by invasive species at time 
 , which is the sum of each land owner’s individual economic damages and additional 
environmental damages that accrue to society.   [ ( )   ]    
    
  is parcel owner 
 ’s individual damage, with    [ ( )   ]   ⁄    and  
   [ ( )   ]   
 ⁄    and 
 ( )   
 ( )     
 ( )    at any level of  invasion  ( ). This individual damage function 
captures the damages at different invasion stage of the parcel, i.e., “noninvaded,” only 
market damage (  
 ) occurs; “being invaded,” physical (  
 ) and market (  
 )damages 
happen, and “fully invaded,” production damage is at a maximum but market damage 
continues to increase as the invasion spreads.   [ ( )] represents environmental 
damages with    [ ( )]   ⁄    and     [ ( )]    ⁄   or   . 40 In the essay, we 
concentrate on the case with a decreasing marginal environmental damage and assume 
 ( )   
 ( )     
 ( )    at any level of invasion  ( ). Therefore, the social damage is 
defined as 
             [ ( )  ]  ∑   [ ( )   ]   
 [ ( )]                                                            (4.2) 
with   [ ( )  ]   ⁄    and    [ ( )  ]    ⁄    and   ( )   ( )    ( )    at 
any level of  invasion  ( ).                                                 
The control cost is determined by the control rate in this barrier control setting.  
 [ ( )]  and  [  ( ) ] are the associated social and corresponding individual  ’s  control 
                                                 
40
 The marginal environmental damage may increase, or decrease, or keep constant with respect to the state 
variable (invading area), which depends on the characteristics of the specific spreading regions.  
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cost functions respectively. The marginal control cost with respect to control rate is 
assumed to be the same among individuals and the social planner, with 
  ( )   ( )    ( )    ( )   ⁄⁄ ,  and    ( )   ( ) ⁄     ( )    ( )   ⁄ . These 
cost functions represents the least cost method of control.  
 
4. Social Optimal Control of Invasive Species Spread 
 
 
4.1 The Social Optimal Control Process – the Benchmark 
 
In case one described in the previous section, the steady-state will be reached 
within the region and control continues indefinitely.  The region area is assumed large 
enough that the social optimal control process and the individual control relay both reach 
the steady-state within the region. The social planner’s problem is to minimize the sum of 
social damages and control costs,  ( )   ( ), through the choice of  ( ), i.e.,  
              
 ( )
  ∫ { ( )   [ ( )  ]   [ ( )  ]}      
 
 
                                     (4.3) 
                       
  
  
 [   ( )] ( ),                                                                               
                  ( )             ,  
                       ( )   ,  ( )    . 
where r is the social discount rate,  ( ) is the revenue in the entire region before 
invasion.   
If  ( ) is the present value costate variable for the invasion area, the present value 
Hamiltonian is 
   [ ( )  ( )  ( )]      { ( )   [ ( )  ]   [ ( )  ]} 
                                         ( )[   ( )] ( ) . 
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 The nonnegativity constraint on  ( ) is included by maximizing the Hamiltonian 
subject to  ( )   . Let  ( ) be the present value Lagrangian multiplier.  Hence, the 
Kuhn-Tucker Lagrangian function is 
   [ ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )]   [ ( )  ( )  ( )]   ( ) ( ).                                 
The corresponding present value necessary conditions are 
41
 
                   ( 
 )    ( )  ( )    ,   ( )                                                           (4.4) 
            [       ( 
 )    ( )  ( )]  ( )                                                                   (4.5) 
            
   ( )
  
  [    ( )]  ( )        ( 
 )                                                           (4.6) 
            
   ( )
  
 [    ( )]  ( )                                                                                    (4.7) 
             ( )                                                                                                                (4.8)     
with  ( ) ( )    where subscripts indicate partial derivatives.                      
Let  ( )      ( ) be the current costate variable. Then, the current value 
necessary conditions can be written as 
               ( )  ( )   ( 
 )   ,   ( )                                                                   (4.4c) 
            [   ( )  ( )    ( 
 )]  ( )                                                                        (4.5c) 
            
   ( )
  
 [  (    ( ))]  ( )    ( 
 )                                                       (4.6c) 
            
   ( )
  
 [    ( )]  ( )                                                                                  (4.7c) 
             ( )                                                                                                              (4.8c) 
                                                 
41
 The superscript asterisk (*) denotes optimal values. 
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  ( ) is the shadow cost of the invaded area at a given instant in time t. In this case, 
the shadow cost represents the incremental damage of an additional unit of invasion. 
From Equation (4.4c) and (4.5c), obtain 
             ( )  
{
 
 
 
                                
 ( )  
  ( 
 )
  ( )
  ( )                        ( )  
  ( 
 )
  ( )
                              
 ( )  
  (    )
  ( )
                                                (4.9) 
There are two extreme cases of invasive species control. If     ( )  
  ( 
 )
  ( )
  , 
then   ( )   . This implies the incremental damage is lower than the marginal control 
cost, and no control is optimal at  ( ). If this condition holds at every point of invasion, 
the damage caused by the invasion is ignored and the invasion spreads following the 
natural rule through the whole region. If    ( )  
  ( 
 )
  ( )
   at any feasible control rate, 
  ( )      , where      is the maximum feasible control rate.  
With an interior solution, the optimal control rate is adjusted with respect to the 
invasion state to satisfy the optimality condition 
  ( 
 )
  ( )
    ( ) for   ( )    (from 
Equation (4.5c)). This equation states that at every time, the marginal control cost equals 
the incremental damage of invasion area in order to ensure a positive optimal control rate. 
At steady-state, the marginal control cost at  , 
  ( )
   
, equals    [   ]   (Equation (4.5c) 
and (4.6c)), the discounted incremental damage at     .
42
 
                                                 
42
 The infinite strip case of Sharov and Liebhold (1998) can be constructed as an infinite horizon problem 
and solved using the same current value necessary conditions in equation (4.4c) to (4.8c). The core 
equation (6) of their paper corresponds to the first-order condition of positive control variable at the steady-
state, i.e.   ( )  
  (   )
 
    . Due to their linear spread function with time, i.e., 
  
  
    , their discounted 
marginal benefit of control (or marginal damage at    ) is 
  (   )
 
. It is also reasonable to conclude that the 
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 Solving Equations (4.4c) and (4.5c) also implies when   ( )    
              ( )   
  ( 
 )
  ( )
                                                                                                 (4.10) 
Taking the time derivative of (4.10) and using Equation (4.7c) yields  
            
   ( )
  
  
   ( 
 )
  ( )
  
 [    ( )]  ( 
 )
  ( )
                                                                    (4.11)                     
Substituting (4.11) into (4.6c), and using (4.7c) and (4.10)  
            
   ( )
  
 
   ( 
 )   ( 
 )  ( )
   (  )
                                                                                    (4.12)     
                       
   ( 
 ) {∑   
 [  ( )  ]
 
      
 (  ( ))}  ( )
   (  )
  
The optimized dynamic system is described by the following coupled nonlinear system of 
differential equations:    
            
   ( )
  
 
   ( 
 )   ( 
 )  ( )
   (  )
 
   ( 
 ) {∑   
 [  ( )  ]
 
      
 (  ( ))}  ( )
   (  )
                      (4.12) 
            
   ( )
  
 [    ( )]  ( )                                                                                  (4.7c) 
The slope of the isocline of  
  ( )
  
   is  
            
  
  
|   ( )
  
  
 
   (  )  ( )   (  )⏞           
 
    (  )⏟  
 
>0                                                                        (4.13) 
as  ( )      ( )    assumed before. 
Figure 4.3 presents a phase diagram of this system. The 
   ( )
  
   isocline, is 
realized by equating the reducing rate and the invasive species natural growth rate 
                                                                                                                                                 
discounted marginal damage, 
  (   )
 
, may equal the marginal control cost at the zero spread rate, i.e.    , 
in some circumstances. In general, before the steady-state, the dynamic optimal rule may portray the 
control rate path as an increasing or decreasing process, which depends on the initial invasion. However, 
after the steady-state time,    , the real spread rate will be zero. 
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(  ( )   ). As the directional arrows indicate, around the   ( )     ⁄  isocline (the 
dashed line), if  ( )   ,   ( )     ⁄  and if   ( )    then    ( )     ⁄ .  Similarly, 
for points above the   ( )     ⁄  isocline (the solid line),    ( 
 )    ( 
 )  ( ), 
implying   ( )     ⁄ , and for points below the isocline,   ( )     ⁄ . These off- 
equilibrium conditions result in a saddle-point stable trajectory, indicated as the dotted 
line.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Phase plane diagram of the system: 
  ( )
  
   and 
  ( )
  
  . 
 
 
 
Two isoclines divide the state space into four isosectors labeled as I to IV. 
Isosectors II and III are convergent while isosectors I and IV are divergent. The 
equilibrium (       ) would be a saddle point. In isosector I, control is increased as the 
invasion approaches eradication.  In isosector IV, decision makers give up on control as 
the area becomes fully invaded.  Isosectors II and III each contain a trajectory (the dotted 
line) which converges to (       ). These two separatrices in Figure 4.3 define the 
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optimal solution trajectories for this infinite horizon problem where partial invasion is 
optimal. The optimal-control feedback policy for this system   ( )    ( ( )) specifies 
the optimal reduction rate corresponding to any given invasion level  ( ).  
Finally, the steady-state is determined directly from Equation (4.12) and Equation 
(4.7c) as 
                
   ( )
  (   )
                                                                                                       (4.14) 
As Equation (4.14) shows, the steady-state invasive species invaded area is positively 
related to the discount rate, r, and marginal control cost,   ( ), but negatively related to 
marginal damage,   ( ). In other words, an increase in the discount rate, which implies 
people care less about the future, leads to a larger steady-state    . If marginal control 
cost with respect to  ( ) increase, less control measures are preferred which results in 
higher    . On the other hand, higher marginal damages associated with invasive species 
induce a lower steady- state     . 
 
4.2 The Costate Variable in Invasive Species Control 
 
The costate variable,   ( ), represents the shadow cost of an incremental increase 
in invasion area (or the marginal value of uninvaded land). The costate variable and the 
state variable play an important role in the optimal control path. Understanding the 
relation between them reveals the tradeoff associated with control and highlights the 
fundamental reasons for different invasive species control results. In this section, the 
relation between the costate variable and the state variable is discussed. Then, the 
components of the costate variable are analyzed.  
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From Equation (4.4c) and (4.5c),    ( 
 )    ( )  ( )    for   ( )   . Using 
the implicit function theorem, get 
            
   ( )
  
  
  ( )
  ( )
                                                                                             (4.15) 
In Zone III of Figure 4.3, the initial invasion area is small and the steady-state is reached 
within the region, therefore the invasion area grows with time t,    ( ) increases as the 
invasion increases, i.e., 
   ( )
  
   in Zone III. While in Zone II, the invasion area 
diminishes due to a high rate of control. Here   ( ) decreases as the invasion decreases, 
i.e., 
   ( )
  
   . Based on the equation of motion for the costate variable, the optimal 
control process is interpreted in Section 4.3.  
Accounting for the components of the costate variable and following Lyon (1999), 
start with Equation (4.6c)   
            
   ( )
  
 [  (    ( ))]  ( )    ( 
 )                                                       (4.16) 
with   (   ) given by the steady-state condition that 
              (   )   
   (   ) 
 
                                                                                            (4.17) 
Equation (4.6c) can be written  
            
   ( )
  
 [  (    ( ))]  ( )    ( 
 )                                                       (4.18) 
Adding   
   ( )
  
  ( ) to both sides of Equation (4.18) and the general solution for 
this differential equation is 
              ( )   [  (   
 ( ))] {∫   [  (   
 ( ))] [  ( 
 )   
   ( )
  
  ( )]     } 
                         [  (   
 ( ))] {∫   [  (   
 ( ))] [  ( 
 )   
   ( )
  
  ( 
 )
  ( )
]     }    (4.19) 
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where   is a constant of integration.  Let  
             ( )  ∫   [  (   
 ( ))] [  ( 
 )   
   ( )
  
  ( 
 )
  ( )
]                                            (4.20) 
Then, Equation (4.19) can be simplified to  
              ( )   [  (   
 ( ))] [ ( )   ]                                                                    (4.21) 
 and  
              (   )   
[  (    ((   ) ))](   ) [ (   )   ]                                                   (4.22) 
Since at the steady-state,   (   )    , then 
                       (   )    (   )                                                                             (4.23) 
Therefore,  
              ( )   [  (    
 ( ))] [        (   )   ( )   (   ) ]                                (4.24) 
                             (     ) (   
 ( ))   (   )
⏞      
                  
 
                             [  (   
 ( ))] ∫   [  (   
 ( ))] {  ( 
 )   [
   ( 
 )
  ( )
   ( 
 )]
  ( 
 )
   (  )
}   
   
 ⏟                                          
                     
 
The effective discount rate is a combination of the normal discount rate, the natural 
spread rate of the invasive species, and the control rate, i.e.,   [    ( )].  The 
effective discount rate can be positive,   [    ( )], negative,   [    ( )], and 
zero,   [    ( )] . The value of the costate variable at t,   ( ), is composed of two 
components. One is an instant effect of invasion, i.e, the present value of uninvaded land 
after the invasion has been stopped (costate variable at the steady-state), and the other is a 
cumulative effect of damage and control cost, i.e., the discounted value of damage and 
control cost flow for an incremental increase in invaded area from   to    .  
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The first component,    (     ) (   
 ( ))   (   ),  integrates the normal 
discounting of time,    (     ) , and the biological discount rate    (   
 ( )) . Similar to 
“the Scarcity Effect” in the optimal control problem of exhaustible resources (Lyon, 
1999), this first component captures the scarcity value of uninvaded land - an exhaustible 
resource. The instant effect of invasion only includes the current time’s damage, no future 
effect, which therefore is called an instant damage effect. The absolute value of the 
instant effect component increases with time and it approaches the steady-state value of  
   (   ) 
 
 as   approaches    .
43
 The diminishing instant effect induces less control in early 
periods.   
The other component of the costate variable represents the cumulative effect of a 
current incremental invasion at   on damage and control cost from t to    ,  i.e., 
  [  (   
 ( ))] ∫   [  (   
 ( ))] {  ( 
 )   [
   ( 
 )
  ( )
   ( 
 )]
  ( 
 )
   ( 
 )
}   
   
 
. It corresponds “the Cost 
Effect” in the natural resource optimal control problem (Lyon, 1999).  This cumulative 
effect is becoming less as   approaches    , i.e., due to the negativity of this component, 
the value of this component is increasing to zero, and the absolute value is decreasing. 
Therefore, the cumulative effect gives more weight to damages early in the invasion and 
induces high early control rate. The instant effect provides more weight on later control, 
while the cumulative effect causes more attention on earlier control. These two opposing 
flows interact together to decide the optimal control path. 
 
 
                                                 
43
 Because   ( )   , a decreasing costate variable implies an increasing   ( ) in absolute value. 
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4.3 Invasive Species Control and the Change of Costate Variable 
 
The motion of the optimal control rate,  ( ), is related with the state variable,  ( ) , 
and the costate variable,   ( ) . From Equations (4.4c) and (4.5c),    ( 
 )  
  ( )  ( )    when   ( )   . Taking   ( )      ( )           ( )   , then 
using the implicit function theorem, get 
            
   ( )
   ( )
  
  ( )
   ( )
                                                                                            (4.25) 
and 
            
   ( )
   ( )
  
  ( )
   ( )
                                                                                            (4.26) 
Also from Equations (4.4c) and (4.5c), when   ( )   ,  
              ( )    
  (   ( )  ( ))                                                                              (4.27) 
Totally differentiate Equation (4.27), 
               ( )      
  ( )  ( )       
  ( )  ( )                                                  (4.28) 
Therefore, the motion of control rate is determined by the combined effect of costate 
variable and state variable. Equation (4.25) implies if at a given invasion point the 
decision maker values the future damages of the incremental invasion less, the control 
will be less, i.e., as the costate variable increases, the control rate decreases ceteris 
paribus.
44
 But the invasion’s spread has an increasing effect on the control rate, shown in 
Equation (4.26). As discussed above, the optimal costate variable may increase as the 
invasion expands.  However, the control rate increases, when     
  ( )  ( )    
   
  ( )  ( )     , Equation (4.28). That implies 
                                                 
44
 Since the costate variable is negative, an increase in the costate variable implies the absolute value is 
decreasing. 
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  ( )
  ( )
                                                                                                (4.29)     
In case one (the steady-state reached within the region), when the initial invasion 
area is small (      ), the optimal control process implies   
   , then 
  ( )
  ( )
    
 . As long as      
  ( )
  ( )
   , the control rate is increasing.  When the initial invasion 
area is above the steady-state, the optimal control process implies       , then 
 
  ( )
  ( )
     . As long as      
  ( )
  ( )
   , the control rate is decreasing.  
From Equation (4.11) and using Equation (4.10) gets 
            
  ( )
  
  
   ( )
  
  ( ) [    ( )]  ( 
 )
   (  )
  
                      
  ( ){
   ( )
  
 [    ( )]  ( )}
   (  )
                                                                   (4.30) 
If the control rate is increasing over time, i.e., 
  ( )
  
  , it must be true that  
   ( )
  
 
[    ( )]  ( )   . Substituting equation (4.6c), yields the following condition for 
the costate variable 
               ( )    ( 
 )                                                                                           (4.31) 
That implies 
              ( )  
   ( 
 )
 
                                                                                                  (4.32) 
In contrast, if the control rate is decreasing over time, i.e., 
  ( )
  
  , the costate variable 
must be 
              ( )  
   ( 
 )
 
                                                                                                   (4.33) 
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In Figure 4.4, the controls of invasive species spread are shown as two different 
converging paths, a small initial invasion area (      ), and a large initial invasion area 
(      ). The changing control rate and the costate variable in Figure 4.4a corresponds 
to the optimal control process of Zone III of Figure 4.3, i.e., a small initial invasion. In 
that isosector, 
   ( )
  
   only when   ( )  
   ( 
 )
 
 and      
  ( )
  ( )
   , the control 
follows the trajectory (the dotted line of Figure 4.3) which converges to (       ).   If 
  ( )  
   ( 
 )
 
, the control deviates from Zone  III to Zone IV.  
If the initial invasion area is above the steady-state, the optimal control process is in 
Zone II of Figure 4.3, which corresponds to Figure 4. 4b. Following the same logic, if 
  ( )  
   ( 
 )
 
 the control rate is decreasing with respect to  , and the steady-state is 
reached. If   ( )  
   ( 
 )
 
 , the control deviates from Zone II to Zone I in Figure 4.3. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) A Small initial invasion area                                 (b)   A large initial invasion area 
Figure 4.4. The trajectory of optimal control rate and costate variable of case one. 
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5. Dynamic Control of Invasive Species under Individual Land Ownership 
 
Without regulatory intervention, the individual land owner will take control actions 
only with respect to his/her own interest. This individual level of control will be less than 
the social optimal control. The deficiency of individual control results from the nature of 
invasive species control - individual cost but partially public benefit. When the invasion 
is found within parcel  , the land owner chooses a level of control at each point of time to 
minimize the present value of his/her own individual damage and control cost flow from 
now to the future. If owner i’s steady-state invaded area is larger than parcel i, he/she 
stops any control once parcel i becomes fully invaded but continues suffering the damage 
from full invasion. Assume    (     ) is the time the invasive species is first 
discovered on parcel 1 and the individualistic control relay starts. For i > 1,      is the 
time at which parcel i-1 becomes fully invaded and its owner stops any controls beyond 
the border. At this point (    ), the invasion initially occurs at parcel   and the individual 
control relay transfers to owner  ,  
              (    )  {
                                         
∑   
   
                                 
                                                         (4.34) 
where     is given. 
Since the individual can only control the spread of invasive species within his/her 
parcel, the control starts at the west border and ends at the east border. Because the 
market damage occurs on all parcels (noninvaded and invaded) in an invaded region, 
individuals initially suffer market damage before the parcel is invaded. For example, the 
decreasing price of output from an invaded region causes an economic loss to all parcel 
owners in the invaded region.  But when invasion spreads onto the parcel this owner also 
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starts to incur physical damage which reaches a maximum when fully invaded. Following 
complete invasion, market damage continues to increase as invasion spreads in the region 
and physical damage remains constant. 
Following this individual control process, each parcel owner’s individual control is 
one turn of an individual spatial control relay. Assume individuals are rational with 
perfect information, they can calculate the time they start and stop the control.
 45
  Each 
parcel owner’s control starts at      , which is decided by the previous controls. However, 
these previous controls do not change the following individual’s control path as a given 
initial condition. Nevertheless, the controls of the following parcel owners determine 
individual i’s terminal time   , being regarded as a transversality condition through an 
anticipated future damage.    
The private optimum control strategy is solved as a chain of individual optimal 
control problems.  Links between individual control problems are handled through initial 
conditions and terminal salvage values.  An individual’s initial condition reflects the 
control decision of all previously invaded individuals.  The salvage value represents an 
individual’s anticipation of future damages given all subsequent individuals behave 
optimally. Individual control over the course of the invasion is found through backward 
induction where the optimal control path of the individual that stops spread (the steady-
state individual) determines the terminal salvage value of the preceding individual’s 
control problem. This procedure is repeated to find all the control decisions from the 
steady-state individual to the initially invaded individual.    
                                                 
45
 In this study, the individuals are assumed to be rational, i.e., all individuals minimize his/her own control 
cost and damage. 
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5.1 The Control of an Individual Owner Reaching the Steady-State 
 
Assume the steady-state is reached within parcel n,   [   ]. Parcel n is facing an 
infinite horizon optimal control problem since control must be exerted indefinitely to 
keep invaded area at steady-state. In contrast, the land parcels before this steady-state 
parcel, denoted as   [     ], are characterized by a fixed terminal state,  (  )  
∑   
 
    , and free terminal time optimal control problem. Let the analysis work backward 
starting with the control decision on parcel  , whose initial condition is described by the 
present value of damages occur before invasion on parcel n as 
              
 [ (    )]  ∑ ∫ {  
 [ ( )   ]} 
     
  
    
   
    
                                     ∫ {   [ ( )   ]} 
     
    
  
                                                (4.35) 
  When the invasion reaches the west border of parcel n, parcel n's owner solves the 
problem, 
              
  ( )
   ∫ { (  )  
 [ ( )   ]   [ 
 ( )]}         
 [ (    )]
 
    
   (4.36)                          
                           
  
  
 [    ( )] ( )  , 
                            (    )  {
                           
∑   
   
                  
, 
      
                
    ( )    ,  ( )   . 
If   ( ) is the current value costate variable and   ( ) is the Lagrangian multiplier, 
the current value Kuhn-Tucker Lagrangian function is 
    [  ( )  ( )   ( )   ( )]    [  ( )  ( )   ( )]    ( )  ( ) 
where 
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             [  ( )  ( )   ( )]  { (  )   
 [ ( )   ]   [ 
 ( )]} 
                                                         ( )[    ( )] ( )  
is the current value Hamiltonian. The corresponding current value necessary conditions 
can be written as 
                ( 
 )     ( )  ( )       ( )                                                          (4.37) 
            [    ( 
 )     ( )  ( )]   ( )                                                                  (4.38) 
            
    ( )
  
 [  (     ( ))]   ( )    
 (  )                                                 (4.39)   
            
   ( )
  
 [     ( )]  ( )                                                                                (4.40) 
             (    )  {
                           
∑   
   
                  
                                                                     (4.41) 
For    ( )    , Equation (4.38) implies 
               ( 
 )      ( )  ( )                                                                                   (4.42) 
and then 
               ( )   
   ( 
 )
  ( )
                                                                                              (4.43) 
       Taking the time derivative of (4.43) and using (4.40) yields 
             
    ( )
  
  
     ( 
 )  ( )
   ( )
  
 
   ( )
  
   ( 
 )
(  ( )) 
 
                           
     ( 
 )
   ( )
  
 [     ( )]   ( 
 )
  ( )
                                                        (4.44) 
Substituting Equation (4.44) into Equation (4.39), and using Equation (4.43), obtain  
            
    ( )
  
 
    ( 
 )   
 (  )  ( )
     ( 
 )
                                                                                (4.45) 
117 
 
Individual  ’s optimal dynamic control is described by the following coupled 
nonlinear system of differential equations   
            
    ( )
  
 
    ( 
 )   
 (  )  ( )
     ( 
 )
                                                                                (4.45) 
            
   ( )
  
 [     ( )]  ( )                                                                                (4.40) 
This system of differential Equation is the same as the social one except for   
 (  )  
  ( 
 ) . As in the social optimal control path, it can be shown that the slope of the 
   ( )     ⁄  isocline is positive, 
             
   
  
|    ( )
  
  
 
   
 (  )  ( )   
 (  )⏞          
 
      ( 
 )⏟   
 
                                                                  (4.46) 
For the 
   ( )
  
   isoclines, the reducing rate equals the invasive species’ natural spread 
rate, i.e,    ( )    . This isoline , 
   ( )
  
   , is a horizontal line with 
   
  
|   ( )
  
  
  . 
     
  corresponds to the time at which the individual control process reaches the 
steady-state within the land parcel  ,    
 , following  the individual control relay of the 
land owners from 1 to  . Finally, the steady-state is determined directly from Equations 
(4.45) and (4.40) as 
               
  
    ( )
  
 (  )
                                                                                                      (4.47)  
Due to the characteristics of damage function and control cost function,   
 (  )    ( 
 ) 
and    
     . This will be shown formally in section 5.3 (see Lemma 4.1).  
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5.2 The Control of the Individual Owners before the Steady-State 
 
Let   
 [ (    )] and   
 [ (  )]be the damages suffered by land owner q before 
being invaded (          ) and after being fully invaded (      ) 
              
 ( (    ))  ∫ {  
 [ ( )   ]} 
     
    
 
                                                  (4.48) 
              
 ( (  ))  ∫ {  
 ( ( )   )}
   
 
  
   (    )  ∫ [   (   
    )]
 
   
  
  (    )    
                                ∫ {   ( ( )   )}
   
 
 
       
[   (   
   )] 
     
 
 
                       (4.49) 
where    
 
 represents the time between individual q becoming fully invaded and the 
individual control relay reaching the steady-state:    
        
 
. 
The salvage damage,   
 ( (  )), consists of two time periods. The first time 
period is from parcel q being fully invaded to the time the individual control steady-state 
is reached,          
  ; and during this period the market damage still increases but the 
production damage stays fixed. The other period extends from the time steady-state is 
reached to infinity,    
      ; and during this period, a constant flow of physical and 
market damages accrue to infinity. Individual q takes the control decisions of other parcel 
owners as given, and makes the optimal control decision to solve  
              
  ( )
   ∫ { (  )   
 [ ( )   ]   [ 
 ( )]}      
  
         
                                   
 [ (    )]    
      
 [ (  )]                                                 (4.50)     
                            
  
  
 [    ( )] ( ),                                                                               
                    (    )  {
                           
∑   
   
                  
 ,  
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    ( )     ( )     (  )  ∑   
 
    ,             
The Hamiltonian and Kuhn-Tucker current Lagrangian function are similar to individual 
 . From (4.50), the current value necessary conditions can be written as 
                ( 
 )     ( )  ( )       ( )                                                           (4.51) 
            [    ( 
 )     ( )  ( )]   ( )                                                                  (4.52) 
            
    ( )
  
 [  (     ( ))]   ( )    
 (  )                                                 (4.53) 
            
   ( )
  
 [     ( )]  ( )                                                                                (4.54) 
             (    )  {
                           
∑   
   
                  
                                                                     (4.55) 
Individual  ’s control problem differs from individual   in that individual   has the 
additional choice variable   .  This requires the following current value transversality 
condition 
             (  )   
 [  (  )   ]   [ 
  (  )]   
  (  )[   
  (  )] 
 (  )    
                
 [ (  )]                                                                                                 (4.56) 
This transversality condition provides the requirement for the individual to decide 
the optimal time to his/her stop control and suffer a fully invasion  
For    ( )    , Equation (4.52) implies 
               ( )   
   ( 
 )
  ( )
                                                                                              (4.57) 
Taking the time derivative of (4.57) and using (4.54) yields 
            
    ( )
  
  
     ( 
 )
   ( )
  
 [     ( )]   ( 
 )
  ( )
                                                          (4.58) 
Substituting (4.58) into (4.53), and using (4.57), obtains  
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    ( )
  
 
    ( 
 )   
 (  )  ( )
     ( 
 )
                                                                                (4.59) 
Therefore the optimaized system is described by the coupled nonlinear system of 
differential equations, 
            
    ( )
  
 
    ( 
 )   
 (  )  ( )
     ( 
 )
                                                                                (4.59)           
            
   ( )
  
 [     ( )]  ( )                                                                                (4.54) 
and the transversality condition in equation (4.56).                
 It can be shown that the slope of the isocline of    ( )     ⁄  is positive,  
            
   
  
|    ( )
  
  
 
   
 (  )  ( )   
 
(  )
⏞          
 
      ( 
 )⏟   
 
                                                                   (4.60) 
   ( ) (     ( )) is the shadow price of invasion area for parcel   ( ). It is 
different from   ( ) of the social control process.  
  ( ) (     ( )) represents only 
parcel q’s (or n’s) valuation of the incremental damage of his/her own parcel, while 
  ( ) values the incremental damage of the whole region- the scope difference. From the 
perspective of an individual parcel owner, at every instant time where there is positive 
control, the marginal control cost should equal the shadow price of invasion area only for 
parcel q or n.  Therefore, the individual control relay is different from the social control. 
Later it will be shown that the control trajectory of the individual control relay is lower at 
the same point in the invasion and the invasion state variable trajectory is larger at the 
same point in time.   
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5.3 The Comparison of the Individual Control and Social Optimal Control 
 
Compared to the social optimal control scheme, the individual isocline 
   ( )     ⁄ ),,1( Ii  is underneath the social isocline   ( )     ⁄ . That leads to 
the Lemma 4.1. 
 Lemma 4.1 The individual control scheme, in which the landowner only considers 
damages that accrue on his/her parcel when making control decisions, leads to a larger 
invaded area.
46
 
As shown in equation (4.14) and (4.47), the social steady-state is reached at the 
point where the marginal control cost equals  
   ( )
 
; the individual’s damage is a part of 
the social one, i.e.,  
   
 ( )
 
 is smaller than  
   ( )
 
 at any given   in absolute value, and 
therefore the steady-state of invasion area under the individual control relay is always 
larger than the social one (see figure 4.5).  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5. Social steady-state versus individual steady-state. 
 
                                                 
46
 See the Appendix C for a detailed proof of this result. 
𝑥 (𝑡) 
 
𝑥𝐷𝑥( )
𝑟
  
$ 
 
𝑥𝐷𝑥
𝑛( )
𝑟
  
 𝑐𝑢(𝑔)  
𝑥𝑠𝑠  𝑥𝑠𝑠
𝑛   
𝜔 (𝑡)𝑥 (𝑡) 
  
122 
 
 
 
To illustrate these findings consider the hypothetical scenario in Fig. 4.6.  A steady-
state invaded area is shown to be reached within the region (case one). Specifically the 
social steady-state of invasion area (   ) is just above    but within   .  The individual 
isoclines    ( )     ⁄  and    ( )     ⁄  are always under the social isocline 
  ( )     ⁄ , the individual control rate at a given invasion area is smaller than the 
social one,    ( )    ( ) and    ( )    ( ). 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
              
                           
                            
 
Figure 4.6. Social steady-state versus individual steady-state of case one with 
                   
        . 
 
 
 
Paths of invasion area implied by social and individualistic control processes are 
shown in Figure 4.7. The dashed and the solid lines describe how the state variable,  ( ), 
changes with time under the individual control relay and the social control. Both lines 
start at the same beginning point    at time     . Since the individual optimal control 
rate is lower than the social one (      ), the invasion area is increasing faster under 
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the individual control than under the social control. At time   , parcel 1 is fully invaded, 
then the owner of parcel 2 starts his/her control and reaches the steady-state    
 
 at time    
 . 
The steady-state of invasion area under social optimal control is smaller and reached 
sooner at time    .  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.7. Invasion areas under social and individual controls of case one with 
                 
        . 
 
 
 
6. Subsidy Scheme 
 
The deficiency of individual control is due to the limit of individual interest 
compared to the social interest. The smaller the individual parcels, the more serious the 
externality is.
47
 As assumed before, the social damage of invasion consists of two 
components:  the sum of individual land owner’s economic damages and the 
environmental damages.  An individual’s pecuniary damage consists of decreases in 
production and reduced quality of the commodity which triggers a reduction in the 
                                                 
47
 This is similar to Hansen and Libecap (2004) who show that the abundance of small farms in the 1930s 
and the potential for uncompensated benefits of erosion control exacerbated wind erosion leading to the 
Dust Bowl.  
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market price. Environmental damages represent the loss in social welfare from an 
invaded ecosystem that accrues to the society other than the parcel owners.
48
 However, 
the parcel owner is only concerned with his/her individual economic losses, thus 
excluding the other land parcels’ losses and the environmental damages from his/her 
optimal control decision making. As discussed in section 5, due to the limitation of 
individual interest, individual landowners enact lower control efforts.  Specifically the 
management authority has to create incentives to encourage the “being invaded” parcel’s 
owner to enact more control efforts to reach the social optimum. 
49
  
A tax or subsidy can be used to motivate an individual to take more control. 
Because individual control efforts create benefits to society (positive externality), a 
subsidy system can be a more reasonable incentive policy approach within an 
individual’s border. Also, the implementation of a tax aggravates the individual’s control 
burden, which may impede the management of invasive species.  Therefore, subsidy is 
considered the main measure to internalize the spatial externality in this essay. 
50
 
                                                 
48
 For example, Foot-and-Mouth disease (FMD) is a viral disease in cloven-hoofed animals. This disease 
can decrease the production of milk and meat, and cause high mortality of young animals.  Even more, the 
animal product from an FMD outbreak area will be banned to other FMD-free regions or sold at a 10-50% 
lower price compared to FMD-free regions (Rich et al., 2005).  FMD can also cause environmental 
damages, such as threatening the health of wild animals. Mad-cow disease, bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy (BSE), is another fatal disease of cattle. To eradicate BSE, millions of cattle were 
slaughtered (Brown, 2000). This disease has also killed more than 200 people around the world by October 
2009 (The National Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Surveillance Unit (NCJDSU), University of Edinburgh, 
2009).  Beef exports from BSE outbreak countries have been also banned.  Among the damage caused by 
EAB (Emerald Ash Borer), market damage includes: 1) opportunity costs as ash trees are not permitted to 
be traded from quarantined areas, and 2) other products from infested areas receiving a lower price than 
from uninvaded areas. These examples illustrate the cumulative nature of productivity loss and market 
damage, as well as environmental loss.  
49
 At time  , only the “being invaded” parcel is making control efforts to slow the spread,  while the “fully 
invaded” parcels have stopped control activities and the “not invaded” parcels have not yet start control 
activities. 
50
 Segerson (1988)’s linear ambient tax gives the correct incentive for polluters to control nonpoint source 
pollution for single or multiple polluters. Here a subsidy is based on the same purpose.  
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6.1 Subsidy on Invaded Land Avoided Index 
 
The subsidy is temporarily offered to the owner of the parcel located at the invasion 
frontier where control activities are being implemented. The subsidy is composed of two 
parts. The first part is incentive compatible component,    ( ), provided at a uniform rate 
of   ( ) per invaded area avoided, [  ( )   ( )], where   ( ) represents the path of 
invasion under the individual control relay.This part subsidy internalizes the externality 
and induces the individual to choose the optimal social control path. The second part is to 
ensure each individual to voluntarily participate the social control scheme, which is called 
the participation compatible component. This subsidy,    ( ), results in no individual 
worse off to participate the social control path than under the individualistic control relay, 
which is lump sum subsidy at each time.  
Let    ( ) and    ( ) represent the individual   and  ’ s reduction rate under the 
subsidy scheme respectively. First, for the steady-state parcel n, the owner solves 
               
   ( )
   ∫ {
 (  )   
 [ ( )   ]   [ 
  ( )]
   ( )[  ( )   ( )]      ( )
}        
 
    
 
                                    
 [ (    )]                                                                               (4.61) 
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              (    )  {
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     ( )       ( )  ∑   
 
    , 
where   
 [ (    )]  ∫ {  
 [ ( )   ]   
    ( )}      
    
  
, 
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and      ( ) is the compensation paid by individual   to other landowners doing control. 
Let    ( )        ( ) be the current value costate variable for the invaded area under 
the subsidy scheme. The current value necessary conditions are 
                 ( 
 )      ( )  ( )        ( )                                                      (4.62)     
            [     ( 
 )      ( )  ( )]    ( )                                                              (4.63) 
            
     ( )
  
 [  (      ( ))]    ( )    
 (  )    ( )                               (4.64) 
            
   ( )
  
 [      ( )]  ( )                                                                              (4.65) 
             (    )  {
                           
∑   
   
                  
                                                                     (4.66) 
The owner of parcel q,   [     ] , the land parcels before the steady-state, 
solves 
               
   ( )
   ∫ {
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                      is free. 
where   
 ( (    ))  ∫ {  
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 , 
where      ( ) is the compensation paid by individual   to other landowners doing 
control. 
Let    ( )        ( ) be the current value costate variable under the subsidy 
scheme. Then, the current value necessary conditions can be written as 
                 ( 
 )      ( )  ( )        ( )                                                       (4.68) 
            [     ( 
 )      ( )  ( )]    ( )                                                              (4.69) 
            
     ( )
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             (    )  {
                           
∑   
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And the current value transversality conditions are  
             (  )   
  [  (  )   ]   [ 
   (  )] 
                 (  )[   
   (  )] 
 (  )     
  [ (  )]                                        (4.73) 
              (  )  ∑   
 
                                                                                                  (4.74) 
Comparing the subsidized individual optimal paths of the control variable, the state 
variable, and the costate variable with the optimal social ones, the only difference exists 
in the costate variable motion rule, i.e., the individual motion rule of the costate variable 
fails to include the other individuals’ and environmental marginal damages with respect 
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to invaded area ( ( ))   Therefore, the social planner can set the subsidy so as to 
compensate the individual owner for the spill-over benefit of his/her control actions 
which will increase the reduction rate of the spread to coincide with the social optimal 
control path. The subsidy rate that internalizes the externality is 
              ( )  ∑   
 [  ( )   ]
 
   
   
   
 (  ( ))                  ( )     (        )  (4.75)     
when the owner of parcel    or   is performing the control activities. The subsidy rate 
captures the damages not included in the individual’s control decision. As the invasion 
spreads, other land owner’s damages and the environmental damages are increasing but 
not at an increasing rate. And the multiplier [  ( )   ( )] may increase as the further 
difference between an individualistic control and social control results. 
The individual costate variable changing function following the subsidy payment is 
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 [  (      ( ))]    ( )    
 (  )                                                           
                                  ∑   
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 (  ( )),  i.e., 
            
    ( )
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then 
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 (  ( )),  
i.e., 
             
    ( )
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 )                                                (4.77)     
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Note that equations (4.76) and (4.77) are the same as Equation (4.6c) which ensures 
the externality has been internalized. The subsidy is only offered to the land which is 
being invaded and taking control efforts. Otherwise, when a parcel is totally invaded or 
not invaded, there are no control efforts, and no subsidy:  
              ( )  {
∑   
 [  ( )   ]
 
   
   
   
 (  ( ))      ( )   
                                                                ( )    
                        (4.78)           
The participation compatibility component of subsidy is to ensure each individual 
at least as well off as they are under the individualistic control relay. This subsidy 
represents the physical damage and control cost avoided by some individuals due to 
social high control level and low invasion state (  ). These individuals gain benefit from 
the social control from the physical damage and control costs otherwise occur under 
individualistic control relay.  Therefore, this part of subsidy is:     
                ( )  
{
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  ∑   
 
   
                          (4.79) 
where k is the set of individuals who will benefit from a delay in invasion as the result of 
additional control by individual i.  
The subsidy at time t , paid by individuals –   to individual   who is controlling the 
spread of invasion, is 
                 ( )  [  ( )   ( )] [∑   
 [  ( )   ]
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6.2 Sources of Subsidy 
 
As discussed before, the subsidy is a compensation scheme organized by the social 
planner to compensate the individual owner for the spill-over benefit from individualistic 
control actions in order to increase the reduction in the spread rate. If the frontier land 
owner can slow the invasion, society and all land parcel owners benefit from his/her 
control efforts by delaying the pace of the invasion. Since the externality affects other 
parcel owners and society as a whole, the subsidy can come from two main sources. One 
is from the owners of individual parcels which are already or not yet invaded. The other 
is from the government.  Each parcel owner, who is not controlling the invasion, has an 
incentive to decrease the spread rate of invasion. Society also has an additional incentive 
to decrease the environmental damage (  ) due to the invasive species. The social 
planner may calculate the total damage and the spill-over benefit of the control activities 
on each parcel and organize the individual owners to implement the subsidy scheme.  
The total spill-over from control by owner   to each of the other land owners   is 
   ∫ {  [   ∑   
   
   ]   
 [ (   
 ) ∑   
   
   ]}  
  
    
                   
Without control on parcel  , the spread rate is  , and all other parcel owners experience 
increasing damage as the invaded area grows, i.e., ∫   [   ∑   
   
   ]  
  
    
,   
             . Under parcel  ’s control, the slower spread rate lessens the other 
parcels’ damage from time     through    to be ∫  
 [ (   
 ) ∑   
   
   ]  
  
    
   
              . This difference is the spillover benefit to parcel owner   from control 
on parcel q . 
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The government also has an incentive to encourage the individual parcel owner to 
do more to slow the spread of invasion.  An additional subsidy is needed to motivate the 
controlling parcel owner to include the environmental damage and do even more control. 
The government only provides the part of the subsidy which compensates the individual 
for the effect of their control on the environment. The total spill-over on the environment 
(  ) is ∫ {  [   ∑   
   
   ]   
 [ (   
 ) ∑   
   
   ]}  
  
    
,  which is due to the individual 
control of parcel land owner  . Without the control by owner  , the spread rate is  , and 
the environmental damage from time     through    is ∫  
 [   ∑   
   
   ]  
  
    
. But 
under parcel owner  ’s control, the lower spread rate lessens the environmental damage 
from time     through    to be ∫  
 [ (   
 ) ∑   
   
   ]  
  
    
     
Regarding to the subsidy, the authority may calculate the benefit from  ’ s control 
as the participants’ valuation about the uninvaded land instead. For individual  ,  at time   
his/her valuation is estimated as  
                 
  ( ( ))(  ( )   ( ))               51                                     (4.81)     
The part for environment is estimated as 
                 
  ( ( ))(  ( )   ( ))                                                                         (4.82) 
And the authority can persuade individual   to provide subsidy to the individual q who is 
controlling the spread of invasion, 
                ( )    
  ( ( ))(  ( )   ( ))          ( )    
                                                 
51
 This equation estimates the difference of damage between an invaded land area under individualistic 
control and an invasion level under control with subsidy, i.e.,    (  ( ))     ( ( ))    
  ( ( ))(  ( )  
 ( )). The same is as equation (4.84). 
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                                                  ( )                                                            (4.83) 
where 
                  ( )  {
                                                
[  
 (     )   [ 
  ]]  [  
 (     )   [ 
  ]]         
     (4.84)     
 and the government  to provide 
                ( )    
  ( ( ))(  ( )   ( ))                                                                (4.85) 
This subsidy may differ from the real benefit at each time, but the sum of subsidy 
approximately represents the spill-over benefit effect. This subsidy scheme reduces the 
stress on the public budget by raising funds from other individual parcel owners and the 
management authority. The subsidy scheme can also be designed to internalize the 
externality on different indexes, such as an individual’s control rate. To sum up, the 
multisource subsidy scheme should compensate individuals for the spill-over benefits of 
their invasive species control (the “partial public” good supplied by the individuals).  
 
7. Numerical Simulation 
 
To illustrate the model’s main findings, consider the following hypothetical 
example. A single commodity is produced in the region and sold in a perfectly 
competitive market. For exposition two simplifying assumptions are made. First, the 
region is a small player in the commodity market. The output of this region counts for 
such a small proportion of the market that the reduction of output due to the invasion 
does not affect the price. Second, the supply of the commodity in this region is inelastic 
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which is consistent with parcels that are unsuitable to produce other commodities and 
also are prohibited from other utilizations.
52
   
Assume the invasion causes a constant percentage (α) decrease in output in the 
invaded area.
53
 Before being invaded parcel   produces   (  ) and after being invaded 
the output decreases to be {     [ ( )]} (  ) at time  .  
 [ ( )] is still the percentage 
of invasion of parcel   , as defined in Equation (4.1) of section 3. As invasion expands, 
  [ ( )] increases and reaches   once    is fully invaded and produces the lowest output 
level. Assume P is the given price of this product with high quality before the invasion. 
Thus, individual   incurs production damage [  (  )]  
 ( ( )) before being fully 
invaded, the maximum ([  (  )]  ) at    (fully invaded), and then the constant 
maximum production damage as the invasion spreads beyond the parcel. The market 
damage is another damage resulting from lower prices for commodities from invaded 
regions. Let   [ ( )] be the total market damage of the region, and   
 [ ( )] represent 
the market damage on parcel  , which is proportional to the total market damage 
weighted by some index, such as land shares and output levels. 
The production damage and the market damage of the land parcel i at time   are 
shown in Figure 4. 8. The perpendicular line represents the inelastic supply and the 
horizontal line describes the perfectly competitive market, i.e. a special case of Figure 4.2. 
At time   the region is found to be invaded and the market price of product from the 
                                                 
52
 Adaptation, such as planting more resistant crop varieties or removing land from cultivation in response 
to the establishment of pests can be a constructive means of decreasing the damage caused by the spread of 
the invasion. Therefore, control and adaptation can be combined in the management of invasive species. 
But in this example, the land owners are excluded from using any adaptation in order to concentrate on the 
externality analysis. In short, the numerical simulation considers intensive margin effects but not extensive 
margin effects.  
53
 It is straightforward to allow the rate of commodity depreciation to increase as invaded area expands.  
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region drops from   to   . If parcel   is not invaded yet, only market damage occurs and 
the damage is area I+II. Once invaded, the production level decreases from  (  ) to 
{    [ ( )] } (  )  and both market and production damages occur given by areas I+II 
+III. Once fully invaded, the production damage reaches its apex, but the market damage 
continues to increase as the invaded area expands beyond the parcel. That market damage 
is the reason why “fully” and “non-invaded” land owner have incentive to control the 
spread of invasive species at each point in time. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.8. The damage of the land parcel i. 
 
 
 
The market damage is assumed to be a linear function: 
              [ ( )]    ( )                                                                                             (4.86) 
And the environmental damage is omitted here to simplify the simulation. This omission 
will not affect the analysis result. The quantity of output is normalized such that one km
2
 
of area yields one unit of output,  (  )    . Therefore, the social damage is 
𝑃𝑡  
P 
Output 
Price 
𝑄(𝐴𝑖)
 {  𝜅𝑖[𝑥(𝑡)]𝛼}𝑄(𝐴𝑖)
 0 
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III 
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             [ ( )  ]     ( )    ( )                                                                           (4.87) 
Market damage is dispersed among land owners according to land share, i.e, the 
weight coefficient of each individual is the land share,  
  
 
   ∑   
 
   . Therefore, parcel 
i’s damage is 
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             [ ( )]   
       ( ) 
  
 
                          ( )  ∑   
 
    
                  (4.88) 
The social and individual control cost functions are assumed to be the same as 
             (   )   [ ( )]                                                                                             (4.89)     
We assume a barrier zone control along the expanding front, and the control cost directly 
relates with the control rate with an increasing marginal control cost. The net revenue 
before invasion ( ( )) is assume to be 40% of revenue, i.e., (       ). 
 
 
Table 4.3 
The parameters in simulation. 
parameter Definition value 
  Discount rate 5% 
  Natural spreading rate of invasive species 10% 
   Parcel  ’s area      
  
  Price of commodity before invasion $20  
  Percent reduction in yield due to invasion 15% 
  A parameter of market damage function   
  A parameter of control cost 22,000 
 
 
 
For convenience, the definition and values of each parameter in the simulations are 
summarized in Table 4.3. Assume there are three parcels in this region, i.e.,       
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 . Later the number, order, and sizes of parcels are varied in the simulation 
of the individualistic control relay. Two initial invaded areas are considered to illustrate 
the effect of species detection on the control decision.  The small initial invasion area is 2 
    and the large initial invasion area is 12 km2. The control path is simulated by using 
GAMS (23.9.2) solvers PATH and CONOPT.  
 
7.1 Simulation of the Social Optimal Control 
 
With these definitions, the social planner maximizes minus sum of damages and 
control costs, i.e., 
              
 ( )
  ∫ { ( )     ( )    ( )  [ ( )] }      
 
 
                                   (4.90) 
                     
  
  
 [   ( )] ( ),                                                                               
              ( )             ,  
                   ( )    ,  ( )    . 
And the current value Hamiltonian is 
             ( )   ( )     ( )     ( )   [ ( )]   ( )[   ( )] ( )             (4.91) 
The equations to be solved to find the social optimal path are: 
               [ ( )]    ( )  ( )     ( )                                                            (4.92) 
            [   [ ( )]    ( )  ( )] ( )                                                                  (4.93) 
            
   ( )
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   ( )
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             ( )                                                                                                              (4.96) 
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The results of social optimal control, small initial invasion area case vs. large one, 
for the state variable (invasion area), the control variable (reduction rate) and the costate 
variable (shadow cost) are shown in Figures 4.9. In the small initial invasion case, the 
control rate is increasing from about 8% to 10%, and the invasion spreads from 2 km
2
 and 
eventually stops at the steady-state, 4.714 km
2
. The costate variable is increasing from -
195.225 as the invasion continues and reaches - 140 at the steady-state. In the case of 
large initial invasion, the control rate declines from 13% to 10%, and the invasion is 
reversed from 12 km
2
 to 4.714 km
2
. The costate variable decrease as the invasion shrinks 
from -98.546 to -140. In both small and large initial invasion cases, the same robust 
steady-state is reached. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.9. Simulation results for social control of invasion. 
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Figure 4.9. (Continual). 
 
 
 
7.2 Simulation of the Individual Control Relay 
 
As in the theoretical analysis, individual control experiences a control relay. 
Assume the individual steady-state is reached within parcel n. Individual   to individual 
   follow their own dynamic optimal control path represented by a fixed terminal state 
and a free terminal time. Individual  ’s infinite horizon dynamic optimal control follows. 
The simulation exercise of individualistic control relay is performed backward. When the 
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control relay reaches to the west border of parcel  , the individual owner   is to solve the 
problem, 
              
  ( )
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The current value Hamiltonian is 
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The equations are to be solved to find the parcel owner m’s optimal path: 
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             (    )  {
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                                                                   (4.103) 
As before,    
  is the time at which the individualistic control relay reaches the 
steady-state. Though individual   can change his/her terminal control time, he/she cannot 
change the other individuals’ control process. Individual   takes these optimal control 
times as a given when making his/her decision. Also as before,    
 
 represents the time 
period between individual  ’s terminal time and the individual control relay reaching the 
steady-state:    
        
 
. 
Individual parcel q’s owner solves the following problem,   [     ],  
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The current value Hamiltonian equation is 
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The equations are to be solved to find the parcel owner q’s optimal path: 
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And the current value transversality condition is  
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Figure 4.10 Simulation results for social optimal control and individual control relay 
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The simulation exercise of individuals before steady-state is applied by a backward 
algorithm design.
54
 A comparison of the individualistic and socially optimal path for the 
invasion area, the reduction rate, and the shadow cost are shown in Figure 4.10. With a 
small initial invasion, the individual control relay reaches the steady-state invasion area at 
7.615 km
2
, larger than the social one (4.714 km
2
). The absolute value of individualistic 
control relay’s costate variable is smaller than the social one, revealing the insufficient 
individualistic interest in controlling invasive species spread. Consequently, the limited 
interest of the individual parcel owner results in a lower control path. 
 
 
Table 4.4 
Alternative land ownership scenarios. 
Type Notation 
number of 
producers 
Individual parcel Total area 
Benchmark A(7.5 3) 3 
      
      
      
  22.5 
Scenario 1:  
Increased producers 
A(       ) 4 
        
        
        
        
  
22.5 
Scenario 2: 
Heterogeneous 
producers, largest 
initially impacted 
A(9, 7, 6.5) 3 
      
      
       
  22.5 
Scenario 3: 
Heterogeneous 
producers, smallest 
initially impacted 
A(6.5, 7, 9) 3 
      
      
       
  22.5 
  
 
 
                                                 
54
 See the Appendix D for a detailed backward algorithm. 
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The insufficiency of privately supplied invasive species control will fluctuate with 
changes in the number of individual owners, the size of individual parcels, and the order 
of small and large parcels. Now four different scenarios are summarized in Table 4.4, 
with simulations of the state variable, the control variable, and the costate variable in 
Figure 4.11.  Given a fixed size of suitable habitat, increasing the number of individual 
owners aggravates the effect of the uncompensated externality and causes the 
individualistic control relay to deviate farther away from the social one and results in a 
larger steady-state invasion area. When landowners are heterogeneous in size, the order 
of parcels also impacts the individualistic control result, e.g., 8.25 km
2
of the steady-state 
of invasion area at Scenario 1 compares to 7.775 km
2
 at
 
Scenario 3.   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.11. Simulation results under various ownership scenarios. 
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Figure 4.11. (Continual). 
 
 
 
7.3 Simulation of Individual Control under a Subsidy 
 
Now following the above assumptions, the subsidy rate is set as 
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The subsidy for the individual q at time t ,      ( ), is 
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  Assume that individual   reaches the steady-state. With the subsidy individual   solves 
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The current value Hamiltonian is 
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The equations are to be solved to find the parcel owner n’s optimal path: 
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For the individuals   ,   [     ] , they solve 
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The current value Hamiltonian equation is 
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The equations are to be solved to find the parcel owner q’s optimal path: 
               [   ( )]      ( )  ( )       ( )                                               (4.124) 
            [   [   ( )]      ( )  ( )]   ( )                                                      (4.125) 
            
     ( )
  
 [  (      ( ))]    ( )       
  
 
   ( )                             (4.126) 
            
   ( )
  
 [      ( )]  ( )                                                                            (4.127) 
             (    )  {
                           
∑   
   
                  
                                                                   (4.128) 
and the current value transversality condition is 
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Figure 4.12. Social control and individualistic control with a subsidy. 
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Figure 4.12. (Continual). 
 
 
 
The simulation exercise with a subsidy is performed in benchmark case, i.e., three 
individual owners with 7.5 km
2
 parcel each. The results are summarized in Figure 4.12 
for the state variable, the control variable and the costate variable. The subsidy fully 
compensates the externality of individualistic control relay, and brings the individual 
control back to the socially optimal control path.  
This subsidy is funded by multiple sources, i.e., non-controlling individuals and the 
social planner. The subsidy rate and the funding sources are demonstrated in Figure 4.13 
and Figure 4.14. As the invasion enlarges, the subsidy rate is constant in response to the 
constant marginal damage. The amount of fund from a participant is determined by 
his/her benefits from the control behavior. The non-controlling individuals compensate 
the controlling individual for his/her higher level of reduction in the spread of invasive 
species. Some of non-controlling individuals also provide extra subsidy for delaying or 
preventing physical damage and control cost otherwise they will occur in individualistic 
control scheme.  This multiple-source subsidy scheme alleviates the tight budget burden, 
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and at the same time internalizes the externality in a way that encourages coordination 
among participants.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.13 Subsidy rate in different scenarios. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.14. Optimal sequences of side payments in different scenarios. 
 
 -
 0.50
 1.00
 1.50
 2.00
 2.50
 3.00
 3.50
1 51 101 151 201 251 301
(a) Rate of side payment to producer 1: h1(t) 
 
Benchmark Scenario 1- 5.625*4
Scenario 2 - 9,7,6.5 Scenario 3 - 6.5,7,9
$     
Time 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
1 51 101 151 201 251 301
(a) Side payment to producer 1  
Benchmark: h₁=2.67 Scenario 1: h₁=3.00 
Scenario 2: h₁= 2.40 Scenario 3: h₁=2.84 
$  
Time 
152 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.14. (Continual). 
 
 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
This paper has developed a dynamic control model to synthesize the biological and 
economic properties of invasive species, such as the spread rule, market and physical 
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damage, control cost, and the participants’ control behaviors. It is found that a spatial 
externality results from the prevalence of myopic multiple spatially-connected 
participants in invasive species control. This outcome is shown to be critical because, 
although the individuals care about the invasion, the limited spatial consideration results 
in the deficiency of individualistic control and requires an intervention from the 
management authority. Analysis of a multiple-source subsidy scheme suggests the 
possibility of coordination among participants. The numerical simulation verifies the 
theoretical propositions and suggests three conclusions. 
First, the control process is determined through the natural spread rule, the discount 
rate, the damaging pattern, and the control cost of the invasive species. High discount rate 
and marginal control cost result in a larger invasion area, but high marginal damages 
expedite the control process and also encourage the preservation of more noninvaded 
land.  
Second, an externality arises due to the different spatial considerations of decision-
makers driving a wedge between an individual’s and society’s damages. The externality 
of individual control creates an uncompensated benefit spillover to other participants, 
resulting in a socially suboptimal level of individual control. 
Third, the properties of invasive species necessitate the coordination of 
participant’s control in a dynamic setting. A multiple-source subsidy policy instrument, 
funded by individuals and government, corrects the externality and overcomes the 
deficiency of individual control. This subsidy scheme expands Wilen’s (2007) chained 
154 
 
bilateral negotiation system to include all participants directly. Individual funding helps 
overcome tight budget constraints and eventually accelerates the control process. 
The study of invasive species is complex and several factors have been left out for 
the future research. The role of invasive species spread pattern has not been explicitly 
addressed in the essay. In practice, linear, logistic spread, or other spread ways may affect 
the control process. The complicacy and variety of damage and control cost requires a 
comparative dynamic analysis to gain more insights into the management. More 
experimental case studies are also important but vacant in lack of data. 
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CHAPTER 5                                                                                                                 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
Invasive species have imposed significant damages worldwide in agriculture, 
fisheries, forestry, and other industries over the past several decades. The prevention and 
control of invasive species has therefore become an urgent issue in several areas of the 
world.  The purpose of this dissertation was to examine to what extent optimal preventive 
and control policies depend upon the economic and biological characteristics of the 
preventing and controlling the process of an invasive-species introduction and spread.  
At the time prevention policies are made, the home country (i.e., the effected 
country) may or may not observe the foreign country’s (i.e., the exporter of an invasive 
species) abatement efforts. Further, random factors affecting the efficacy of the 
abatement process impede the home country’s ability to acquire information necessary 
for optimal control policies. Particularly for risk-averse foreign countries, uncertainty 
also influences their abatement decisions and complicates the prevention process. The 
spread of invasive species within a given region is a dynamic process which involves 
multiple participants, such as individual land owners. The existence of positive 
externalities results in the insufficiency of individual control from the optimal social 
perspective. The urgency of controlling the spread of invasive species entails the 
coordination of these individual participants. 
To begin, this study investigates the effectiveness of a traditional tariff on exported 
goods (levied by the home country) and proposes a targeted invasive-species tariff in a 
deterministic, perfect-observability setting. I find that in the case of a constant 
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relationship between invasive species level and shipment size, the traditional tariff can be 
used to optimally control the invasive species level in the short term. However in the long 
term, the entry condition is distorted and results in a suboptimal industry size in the 
foreign country, which in turn entails a lump-sum subsidy to correct the distortion. In the 
case the invasive species level determined directly by the foreign firm’s abatement effort 
(i.e., the invasive species level is not functionally related to shipment size), an invasive-
species tariff levied directly on the invasive species level is necessary to attain the home 
country’s optimal invasive species level.  The home country’s welfare is directly related 
to the foreign firm’s abatement cost, total shipment size, the invasive species level, and 
the invasive-species tariff rate. 
In the case of a home country with imperfect information concerning the abatement 
efforts of foreign country and the existence of random environmental variables in 
abatement process, Holmstrom’s (1979) framework is adopted to guide the design of 
contracts to motivate the foreign country to choose an optimal abatement effort. A 
contract’s subsidy from the home country to the foreign country is in general higher than 
the home country’s first-best subsidy under perfect information.  A standard tournament 
scheme is then developed following Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) for the case of multiple 
risk-averse foreign countries facing both individualistic and common random factors. I 
show that a rank-order tournament is capable of attaining the home country’s first-best 
solution.  
In the dissertation’s final essay, an incentive scheme is proposed to prompt 
coordinated control of a spreading invasive species in a region or a country.  Biological 
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and economic properties are integrated in order to model a dynamic process of 
controlling an invasive species, such as the spread rule, market and physical damage, 
control cost, and the participants’ control behaviors. I find that individualized control is 
deficient, leading to an uncompensated spatial externality.  The spatial externality results 
from the prevalence of myopic, multiple, spatially-connected participants due to their 
respective limited spatial considerations, which in turn becomes the critical target of an 
intervention policy. A multiple-source subsidy instrument, aiming to correcting the 
externality, which is funded by participants and the government, overcomes the 
deficiency of individual control. This subsidy scheme expands Wilen’s (2007) chained 
bilateral negotiation system to include all participants directly, and attempts to alleviate 
the regulatory authority’s budget burden. 
There are several insights from these models of preventing and controlling the 
spread of an invasive species. First, the discount rate, biological characteristics of 
invasive species, effectiveness of detection, level of damage, and cost of control 
determine the prevention and control process.  Second, there are multiple choices as a 
base for a tax or subsidy scheme, such as a tariff on import volume or on invasive species 
level, a subsidy on the avoided invaded land, or on control rate itself. The economic 
instrument (e.g., tax or subsidy) should be directly applied to the targeted behavior in 
order to achieve an efficient outcome. 
Lastly, I show that incentive and participation compatibility are important in policy 
design.  For example, in the static contracting models mentioned above, the home country, 
especially when constrained by imperfect information, must satisfy a participation 
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constraint, and motivate the foreign countries to choose abatement decisions consistent 
with the home country’s objective. With respect to the dynamic spatial externality model, 
the coordination process similarly relies on encouraging individual participants to 
internalize social benefits through a voluntary cooperation scheme, which provides at a 
minimum status quo welfare level for each participant. At the same time, the incentive 
scheme must bring decentralized, individual control back to the socially optimal control 
path.  
Controlling invasive species involves cooperation among countries, regional 
authorities, and individual participants. This process is influenced by biological, 
technological, and economic factors, which requires further studies in the future. For 
example, spread patterns should be explicitly addressed for different types of invasive 
species. Basing on the spread pattern, specific and efficient prevention and control polies 
may then be promulgated to target the specific invasive species. The evaluation and 
simulation of damage and control cost also provide insights into the management of 
invasive species. Experimental case studies, which can provide greater understanding of 
the spread and control of invasive species, need to be undertaken despite limitations due 
to the lack of data. Cooperation among ecologists, biologists, and economists may lead to 
a more thorough understanding of specific invasive species problems and how best to 
solve them.  
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 Appendix A. Optimal Tariff and Lump-Sum Entry Tax/Subsidy 
 
 
The simplest way to determine the lump-sum entry tax/subsidy is to begin by 
assuming there is a global planner, whose goal is to maximize the joint welfare of the 
home country and the foreign firms.  
Joint welfare is defined as, 
                  
      ∫  ( )  
  
 
   ( )   ( ( ( ))                                                          (A1) 
 
Case 1: Fixed Relationship between Invasive-Species Size and Shipment Size 
 
The global planner’s objective is then, 
               
 
   ∫  ( )  
  
 
   ( )   ( ( (  ))                                               (A2) 
leading to the first-order conditions for an interior solution, 
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                                                               (A3) 
and 
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  (  )
 (  )
 ( )                                                             (A4) 
From (A3), the optimal level of shipment size, therefore satisfies, 
            
  ( )
  
  (  )  
  (  )
 (  )
  ( )
  
                                                                            (A3') 
  Since the foreign firms are each price-takers, in the absence of the social planner their 
respective problems are,   
              
 
       ( )                                                                                        (A5) 
   leading to the first-order condition, 
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  ( )
  
  (  )                                                                                                  (A6)     
  Thus, comparing (A3’) and (A6), a tariff rate set as    
  (  )
 (  )
  ( )
  
   induces each 
foreign country to export the socially optimal shipment size to the home country. Note 
that this tariff rate is identical to that derived in the text, equation (2.5). Given this tariff 
rate, the firms’ respective zero-profit conditions become, 
                ( )  
  (  )
 (  )
  ( )
  
                                                                           (A7)     
which differs from the optimal industry size conditions (A4). Therefore, as in Spulber 
(1985), a lump-sum tax (or subsidy) per firm, T
*
, equal to 
                [
  ( )
 (  )
 ( )
 
 
  ( )
 (  )
  ( )
  
]                                                                              (A8)     
is needed, where each function comprising T
* 
is evaluated at the optimal values of s and n 
determined by (A3) and (A4), thus ensuring the optimal number of foreign firms in the 
market.
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Case 2. Non-Fixed Relationship between Contamination Level and Shipment Size 
 
Assume joint welfare is defined the same as in case 1. The foreign firm can control 
the invasive-species contamination level directly by adjusting its abatement effort. 
Therefore, the global planner’s objective is expressed as,  
               
   
   ∫  ( )  
  
 
   (   )   (  )                                                    (A9) 
The first-order conditions for an interior solution are, 
                                                 
55
 Later in the text it is shown that the home country’s optimal “invasive-species tariff”   , i.e., a tariff 
levied directly on the shipment’s invasive-species level rather than on the shipment size itself, is    
  ( )  (  )⁄ . As Spulber (1985) teaches us, plugging this   into (A8) also determines T*=0, i.e., the global 
planner’s problem does not necessarily need to be solved to determine T*.  
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Since the foreign firms are each price-takers, in the absence of the social planner 
their respective problems are,   
              
   
       (   )                                                                             (A13)     
    leading to the first-order conditions, 
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and 
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                                                                                           (A15) 
Thus, comparing (A10) and (A14), (A11) and (A115), a traditional tariff rate set as 
      and an invasive-species tariff rate set as    
  ( )
 (  )
, induces each foreign firm to 
export both the socially optimal shipment size and the invasive species level to the home 
country. Note that this tariff rate and the invasive-species tariff rate are identical to those 
derived in the text, equations (2.18) and (2.19). Given this tariff rate the firms’ respective 
zero-profit conditions become, 
                (   )  
  (  )
 (  )
                                                                             (A16) 
This zero-profit condition is identical with (A12). Therefore, the traditional tariff and 
invasive-species tariff scheme induce the optimal number of foreign firms.  
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Appendix B. Proof of Lemma 3.1. 
 
First, following Holmstrom (1979) we prove that   . 
By first-order stochastic dominance (FOSD), it follows that ∫ (    )   
∫ (    )   for every I, and any given      .  Thus, ∫   (   )     , and there 
must exist an open set of invasive-species sizes   {     (   )    } for all    
 .    is 
the largest possible sized set satisfying this condition.  
Therefore, if    , then   . Otherwise, from (3.15), 
 
  ( )
    
  (   )
 (   )
   
for all     , which contradicts the curvature condition on welfare function  ( ), 
  ( )   . 
For    , assume that    . Using conditions (3.5) and (3.15), we then have, 
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  (  ( ))
                                                                (B1)     
for      , where     satisfies  {    (   )    } and  
 ( ) is the first-best subsidy. 
This result occurs because    ( ( ))⁄   is increasing in  ( ), which implies  
 ( )    ( ) 
for       . Conversely,   ( )    ( )for     , and   ( )    ( )for       , where 
      {    (   )    }. Therefore for all I we obtain,  
∫   ( )  (   )   ∫  
 ( )  (   )   by FOSD. 
Furthermore, since by FOSD   (    )   (    ) for every  , and   ( ) is a 
constant with respect to all I, it implies ∫   ( )  (   )     from the assumption  
∫  (   )     (with strict inequality for some  ). Thus,  
            ∫   ( )  (   )   ∫  
 ( )  (   )                                                             (B2) 
Also by FOSD and the maintained assumption of increasing damage,  
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            ∫ ( )  (   )                                                                                               (B3) 
From the foreign country’s profit maximization problem, we obtain 
            ∫ (  ( ))   (   )    
  ( )                                                                      (B4)    
Combining equations (3.16), (B2), (B3), and (B4), we obtain 
 ∫ ( )  (   )   ∫  
 ( )  (   )  ⏟             
 
  {∫ (  ( ))   (   )    
  ( )}⏟         
 
  . 
It follows that     must hold, which contradicts the assumption   . We 
therefore conclude that    . 
Next, we prove that    . 
Again by FOSD, it follows that ∫   (    )   ∫   (    )    which implies 
∫    (   )     . Because I can never be negative, we again note the existence of an 
open set      such that   (   )    for all    
  . If    , when    , condition (3.15) 
then implies that   (  ( ))     at any      , which contradicts the maintained 
curvature conditions on V(.). Thus,    .  
Q.E.D. 
 
Appendix C.  Proof of Lemma 4.1 - Individual Control Deficiency 
 
For the parcel   [     ], the individuals not reaching the steady-state, the 
nonlinear system of differential equations is 
            
    ( )
  
 
    ( 
 )   
 (  )  ( )
     ( 
 )
                                                                                (4.59) 
            
   ( )
  
 [     ( )]  ( )                                                                                (4.54)           
 The nonlinear system of differential equations under the social optimal control is 
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   ( )
  
 
   ( 
 )   ( 
 )  ( )
   (  )
   
                       
   ( 
 ) {∑   
 [  ( )  ]
 
      
 (  ( ))}  ( )
   (  )
                                                    (4.12) 
            
   ( )
  
 [    ( )]  ( )                                                                                  (4.7c) 
Compare Equation (4.59) with (4.12), at any specific x(t).  If     ( )     ⁄ , 
   ( ) satisfies     ( 
 )    
 (  )  ( ), and if   ( )     ⁄ ,  ( ) ensures    ( 
 )  
{∑   
 [  ( )   ]
 
      
 (  ( ))}  ( ).By the properties of the individual damage 
function and the social damage function, ∑   
 [  ( )   ]
 
      
 (  ( ))    
 (  )for 
any   [     ],  implying that at specific x(t),     ( 
 )     ( 
 ). With non-
decreasing marginal control cost functions        ( )
  
  
     
  
  
 for the same x(t).This 
implies the     ( )     ⁄  isocline is below the   ( )     ⁄  isocline for any 
  [     ]. 
For parcel n, the individual reaching the steady-state, the nonlinear system of 
differential equations under the individual control is 
            
    ( )
  
 
    ( 
 )   
 (  )  ( )
     ( 
 )
                                                                                (4.45) 
            
   ( )
  
 [     ( )]  ( )                                                                                (4.40) 
Compare Equation (4.45) with (4.12), at a specific x(t), if     ( )     ⁄ ,    ( ) 
satisfies     ( 
 )    
 (  )  ( ), and if   ( )     ⁄ ,  ( ) ensures    ( 
 )  
{∑   
 [  ( )   ]
 
      
 (  ( ))}  ( ). By the properties of the individual damage 
function and the social damage function, ∑   
 [  ( )   ]
 
      
 (  ( ))    
 (  )  . Just 
as the proof of q parcel,  ( )     ( ) for any x(t) implying 
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             ( )    ( )
  
    ( )
    ( )     ( )
  
    ( )
                                                               (C1) 
which implies the       ⁄    isocline is below the     ⁄    isocline. 
At the social steady-state,  ( )   ; and at the individual steady-state,    ( )   . 
The individual and social steady-states are characterized by      ( )     ( ) and  
            {∑   
 [   (   )   ]
 
      
 (   (   ))}   (   )    
 (   
 (   
 ))   
 (   
 )          (C2) 
 But  ∑   
 [  ( )   ]
 
      
 (  ( ))    
 (  ) at any x(t), and we also assume 
 ( )   
 ( )     
 ( )    for all   [   ] and  ( )   
 ( )     
 ( )   . This implies that 
equation (C2) can only hold when 
               (   )     
 (   
 )                                                                                              (C3) 
for any   [   ]. 
Q.E.D  
 
Appendix D. The Backward Algorithm 
 
As in the theoretical analysis, an individual control relay reaches the steady-state at 
parcel n. The individual owner   starts to solve the problem in Equation (4.36) once 
invaded. The simulation exercise of all individuals before steady-state is applied by a 
backward algorithm design. The backward algorithm is performed through these steps: 
1. Calculate the control path of individual   and the steady-state of    
 . 
Calculate individual  ’s costate variable at     , the initial costate variable’s value under 
individual  ’s control. Using Equaltion (4.55) and (4.56) get      
             (    )   
   [  (    )     ]   [ 
    (    )]   
                 (    )[   
    (    )]     
   [ (    )]                                       (D1)    
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and 
             (    )  ∑   
   
                                                                                                 (D3) 
2. Calculate individual    ’s control rate, state variable, and costate variable from 
time        to      by using Equations (4.51) to (4.54) and  
    (    ), and  (    ). 
            
{
 
 
 
      (      )  √
  (   ) (      )  (      )
  
  
     (      )  
     (    )      
    
 
    (       (      ))
     
 (      )  
 (    )
         (      )
                       
                                    (D4) 
3. Reiterate steps 2 and 3 from individual     to the initial invaded owner. 
             (    )   
   [  (    )     ]   [ 
    (    )] 
                  (    )[   
    (    )] 
 (    )     
   [ (    )]            (D5)              
              (    )  ∑   
   
                                                                                       (D6) 
and  
            
{
 
 
 
      (      )  √
  (   ) (      )  (      )
  
  
     (      )  
     (    )      
    
 
    (       (      ))
     
 (      )  
 (    )
         (      )
                       
                                    (D7)     
173 
 
CURRICULUM VITAE 
YANXU LIU 
Department of Applied Economics 
Utah State University 
2014 
 
 
EDUCATION                                                           
 
PhD, Economics                                                                                  Expected: May, 2014 
    Utah State University                                                                                       Logan, UT  
    Dissertation Title:  “Three Essays on the Economics of Controlling Invasive Species” 
    Advisers: Dr. Arthur Caplan 
                    Dr. Charles Sims 
 
Master’s Degree in Management                                                                           June 2007  
    Northeast Dianli University                                                                             Jilin, China 
 
Bachelor’s Degree in Accounting                                                                          July 1992 
    Jilin Finance and Trade College                                                           Changchun, China 
 
RESEARCH EXPERIENCE                                     
 
Graduate Research Assistant                                                                                2007-2012 
Utah State University                                                                                           Logan, UT 
    Develop both static and dynamic models of invasive-species control, use policy 
    instruments such as tariffs, contracts, tournaments, and subsidies in both deterministic  
    and stochastic settings 
 
TEACHING EXPERIENCE                                     
 
Instructor 
Utah State University                                                                                            2014-2014 
    Teaching online Macroeconomics and International Trade                             Logan, UT 
 
Adjunct Instructor                                                                                                 2013-2013 
Weber State University                                                                                        Ogden, UT 
    Taught Mathematical Economics  
 
Teaching Assistant                                                                                                2008-2010 
Utah State University                                                                                           Logan, UT 
Graded Mathematical Economics assignments 
  
174 
 
Lecturer                                                                                                                 2003-2007 
Northeast Dianli University                                                                                 Jilin, China 
    Taught Auditing, Financial Accounting, and Managerial Accounting 
 
Teacher                                                                                                                 1993-1993 
Worker’s College of Jilin Chemical Industry Group                                          Jilin, China 
     Taught Statistics 
 
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE                                     
 
Head of Finance and Accounting Department                                                     2002-2002 
Associated Head of Finance and Accounting Department                                   2001-2001 
Jilian (Jilin) Petrochemicals Ltd.                                                                         Jilin, China 
     
Accountant                                                                                                           1994-2000 
Jilian (Jilin) Petrochemicals Ltd.                                                                         Jilin, China 
 
WORKING PAPERS 
                                                                                                                                     
 Y. Liu and C. Sims, Spatial-dynamic externalities and coordination in invasive 
species control, in progress  
 Y. Liu and A. Caplan, An Invasive-species subsidy and tournament under 
uncertainty, in progress  
 Y. Liu and A. Caplan, How a tariff works as an invasive-species control policy, in 
progress 
 
CONFERENCE AND PRESENTATION 
 
Presentations  
    Y. Liu and C. Sims, “Spatial-Dynamic Externalities and Coordination in Invasive 
Species Control”, 2013 AAEA & CAES Joint Annual Meeting, Washington, DC, USA, 
2013    
    Y. Liu and A. Caplan, “How a tariff works as an invasive-species control policy”, 
Intermountain Graduate Research Symposium, Utah State University, Logan, UT, USA, 
2013                                                                                   
    Y. Liu and A. Caplan, “An Invasive-Species Subsidy and Tournament under 
Uncertainty”, Western Regional Science Association 52nd Annual Meeting, Santa Barbara, 
CA, USA, 2013 
    Y. Liu and C. Sims, “Dynamic Control of Invasive Species: Insights from Analysis of 
Spatial Externalities”, Intermountain Graduate Research Symposium, Utah State 
University, Logan, UT, USA, 2012   
 
 
 
175 
 
 
PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS 
  
 Chinese Institute of Certified Public Accountants  
 Golden Key International Honour Society  
 American Economic Association 
 Agricultural & Applied Economics Association 
 
AWARDS  
 
AAEA Trust Committee Travel Grant                                                                           2013 
    Agricultural & Applied Economics Association                                      Milwaukee, WI 
  
Graduate Student Senate (GSS) Conference Travel Awards                         2012 and 2013 
    Utah State University                                                                                      Logan, UT 
  
